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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines current efforts to transform the U.S. Army to face new 
challenges.  The Army’s transformation is based on the development of the Future 
Combat System (FCS), initiated in 1999.  The FCS consists of eight new manned 
vehicles, various unmanned sensors, robotic vehicles, and remote controlled missiles, all 
connected by a common network.  Critics of the Army’s transformation contend that this 
equipment and associated doctrine is based on traditional Cold War scenarios rather than 
the types of challenges the Army is likely to face.  This thesis examines whether the FCS 
is influenced by traditional preferences for certain types of doctrine, equipment, and 
capabilities.  To do this, the development of the Army’s current capabilities, through past 
reforms, is first described.  Second, the influence of tradition on the development of 
future capabilities is examined.  Third, the potential for FCS to achieve its design goals is 
measured in both technical and strategic terms.  Fourth, the manner in which FCS 
capabilities relate to irregular warfare is examined from the perspective of the Army’s 
combat arms branches.  Finally, considering the significance of institutional culture and 
past reforms, this thesis determines if outdated traditional considerations influence 
current Army transformation efforts.  
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I. ARMY TRANSFORMATION  
On October 12, 1999, Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki unveiled a 
dramatic plan to transform the U.S. Army.  He shocked the Army community by 
announcing that lighter, faster, and more fuel-efficient vehicles would eventually phase 
out heavy vehicles such as Abrams tank sometime during the 21st century.  These new 
vehicles would be the basis for a force that was strategically responsive and dominant 
across the full spectrum of operations.  Shinseki’s audience consisted of attendees to the 
annual Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C.  
This audience was purposefully chosen, as it typically contains a large number of defense 
contractors with display booths eager to peddle their latest wares.  The direct appeal to 
industry served to provide “irreversible momentum” for transformation, although 
Shinseki was careful to mention that transformation was not about “shiny new 
equipment.”1   
 The plan called for an “Objective Force” equipped with a Future Combat System 
(FCS) that would eventually replace units organized around the Abrams tank.  The exact 
design of this system was not yet determined with the hope that a “systems approach” 
might stimulate professional and corporate interest.  In the meantime, an “Interim Force” 
would use current technology to test new operational concepts.  The design parameters 
for the new equipment revolved around the goal of deploying a brigade in 96 hours to 
anywhere in the world, followed by a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in a 
month.2   
As transformation efforts gathered momentum, on June 14, 2001, U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) issued a new version of its capstone 
Operations manual, and the entire Army donned black berets.3  Currently, the U.S. Army 
                                                 
1 Joe Burlass. “Shinseki Leaves Indelible Legacy of Irreversible Momentum.” Shinseki Farewell 
article. At: http://www.army.mil/features/ShinsekiFarewell/FarewellArticle.htm  Accessed on 25 Feb 08. 
2 Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones. “The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: 
Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Deployment Options.” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), iii. 
3 The next version of this manual is scheduled for release on February 28, 2008. 
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officially defines FCS and its purpose with the following statement: “Future Combat 
Systems (FCS) is the Army’s modernization program consisting of a family of manned 
and unmanned systems, connected by a common network, that enables the modular force, 
providing our Soldiers and leaders with leading-edge technologies and capabilities 
allowing them to dominate in complex environments.”4  The FCS consists of eight new 
manned vehicles, various unmanned sensors, robotic vehicles, and remote controlled 
missiles, all connected by a common network, as illustrated in the figure below:  
 
Figure 1: The Future Combat System (From GAO) 
 
The term “Interim Force” is no longer used today, as it is already part of the current 
force, consisting of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs).  Instead of “Objective 
Force,” the term “Future Force” is currently used to describe the components depicted in 
                                                 
4 According to the Army’s official FCS website; At: http://www.army.mil/fcs. Accessed on 25 Feb 08. 
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Figure 1.5  This equipment is intended to allow the U.S. Army to “retain a decisive 
military-technological edge” and to have more capabilities for “irregular combat.”6   
Since 1999, the FCS program has grown to include over 550 contracts and 
subcontracts in 41 states and 220 congressional districts.7  A former Army officer and 
current congressional staffer declared, “When a program gets to a certain size, in the 
billions, it employs so many people in so many districts you can’t kill it.”8  Today, it is 
the second most expensive program on the defense budget, following the Joint Strike 
Fighter.9  Critics of the Army’s transformation contend that this equipment and 
associated doctrine is based on traditional Cold War scenarios rather than the types of 
challenges the Army is likely to face.   
This thesis examines whether the FCS is influenced by traditional preferences for 
certain types of doctrine, equipment, and capabilities.  To do this, it first describes the 
development of the Army’s current capabilities.  Second, the influence of tradition on the 
development of future capabilities is examined.  Third, the potential for FCS to achieve 
its design goals is measured in both technical and strategic terms.  Fourth, the manner in 
which FCS capabilities relate to irregular warfare is examined from the perspective of the 
Army’s combat arms branches.  Finally, considering the significance of institutional 
culture and past reforms, this thesis determines if outdated traditional considerations 
influence current Army transformation efforts.  
Chapter II describes the development of the Army’s current force structure.  The 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states that current military capabilities are suited for 
traditional challenges.  This chapter determines the origins of the Army’s doctrinal focus 
on traditional conventional operations.  Military doctrine is a component of national 
                                                 
5 Thomas Adams. The Army After Next. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 183. 
6 Official FCS website; At: http://www.army.mil/fcs. Accessed on 25 Feb 08. 
7 Alec Klein. “The Army’s $200 Billion Makeover.” Washington Post. (7 December 2007),  A01. 
8 Ibid.,   A01. 
9 Paul L. Francis. “Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Challenges and Prospects for 
Success.” Testimony on the Subcommittee for Airland, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2005),  14. 
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security policy that addresses how military forces should be structured and employed.10  
After Vietnam, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provided the impetus for 
U.S. Army doctrinal reforms.11  TRADOC was established in 1973, and serves as a 
centralized brain for the Army.  Today, the organization’s website states, “TRADOC is 
the Architect of the Army, and thinks for the Army to meet the demands of a Nation at 
war while simultaneously anticipating solutions to the challenges of tomorrow.”12  
TRADOC produces the Army’s doctrinal manuals, and is influential in training and 
weapons procurement.13  This chapter describes how past doctrine, training, and 
equipment, combined with changes in the personnel system, led to the development of 
today’s capabilities.    
Chapter III traces the development of new uniforms to determine if they indicate a 
change in focus for the Army.  During the Cold War, the U.S. Army focused on a 
potential conflict in Europe against the Soviet Union.  In Masks of War, Carl Builder 
argues this focus fit with the Army’s traditional conceptions of war, as the terrain itself is 
influential on doctrine:   
Terrain as a word does not have deep meaning to the nonsoldier, but to the 
soldier it is everything.  It is the fixed field within which he operates.  It is 
the opponent that he must face no matter who may be his enemy.  It is the 
fact of terrain that establishes the field within which the soldier’s 
professional intellect must generate its plans.14  
 
Builder argues the terrain in Europe was ideally suited for a balance of power among 
infantry, artillery, and armor proponents, while desert terrain might require more armor, 
and jungle terrain might require more infantry.15  Certainly, the enemy’s actions matter 
                                                 
10 Barry Posen. The Sources of Military Doctrine. (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 
1984),  13. 
11 Christina Fishback.  “U.S. Army’s Reaction to FM 100-5.” Master’s Thesis Draft. (Manhattan: 
Kansas State University, 2008). Introduction.   
12 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.  At: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm.  
13 For example, the current commander of TRADOC works in conjunction with the AUSA to develop 
the AUSA’s official lobbying position for force modernization in terms of specific programs.  In turn, the 
AUSA, with cooperation from industry, lobbies Congress and Presidential Administrations with its budget 
objectives.  From: AUSA website.  At: http://www.ausa.org/WEBINT/DeptGovAffairs.nsf/byid/JRAY-
6VBPQL.  Accessed on 22 Feb 08. 
14 Builder,  88.  He quotes Admiral J.C. Wylie as saying this. 
15 Ibid.,  189. 
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just as much as the terrain.  In any case, during past reforms, the Army introduced a new 
uniform to signify it was undergoing change.  This trend was foreshadowed with the 
simultaneous adoption of the beret and FM 3-0 Operations in June 2001.  By 2004, 
transformation efforts increased pace, and the Army introduced a new camouflage pattern 
to replace the use of desert camouflage.  The design characteristics of the FCS are evident 
when the new uniform is examined from the perspective of institutional culture. 
 Chapter IV assesses the strategic responsiveness of the FCS, in terms of how fast 
it can deploy, and the role of networked sensors in lieu of heavy armor protection.  The 
FCS is intended to deploy by aircraft in order to meet Shinseki’s deployment goals.  This 
is known as air-mechanization.  The first section of this chapter examines deployment 
times and logistical requirements for the FCS.  Additionally, this section offers two 
historical cases of rapid deployment of mechanized forces with aircraft into a hostile 
environment in order to assess the political and strategic characteristics of Shinseki’s 
technical objectives.  The second section of this chapter assesses the possibilities and 
limitations of using networked sensors for increased situational awareness.  This analysis 
describes the software component of FCS, and frames it alongside recent examples of 
networked systems in combat scenarios.  
 Chapter V examines FCS components as they relate to the Army’s combat arms 
branches, and the manner they are intended for irregular warfare.  Additionally, it 
examines the role of budget politics in force modernization.  Politics is a struggle for 
power over who decides in an organization.  The budget is the manner in which funds are 
distributed in an organization.  For the U.S. Army, budget politics is a matter of who 
decides how money is spent within the institution as well as how much money is received 
in relation to other services.  The FCS relies heavily on long-range strike systems. This 
creates tension with the U.S. Air Force, and may detract from irregular warfare 
capabilities.  This chapter examines these considerations.   
 After considering past reforms, FCS capabilities, irregular warfare, and budget 
politics, Chapter VI concludes whether traditional considerations continue to influence 
the Army’s current transformation.   
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II. TRADITIONAL WARFARE 
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) defines traditional warfare as a familiar 
form of war fought by conventional forces in which the enemy is a nation-state.16  In the 
QDR, an elaborate chart illustrates that “today’s capability portfolio” is suited for 
“traditional challenges.”   
 
Figure 2: Shifting Focus (From QDR) 
 
The arrow dictates that the military must shift the development of capabilities and 
“transform” to face new types of challenges.17  Use of the word “traditional” to describe 
a form of warfare implies that the military has a level of institutional culture capable of 
influence over preference for types of doctrine, organization, and equipment.  This 
                                                 
16 Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review. (Washington, D.C., 2006),   vi. 
17 Before the publication of the QDR, the U.S. Army believed it was already transforming.  This is 
evident because planners took this chart from the QDR and made a PowerPoint slide with the heading, 
“Future Combat System.”  
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chapter will clarify this categorization for the U.S. Army, since the QDR’s definition may 
not be useful for a specific service’s military planner, and each service has peculiar 
traditions that are not necessarily similar.  The QDR is one of many publications (among 
both government and academia) expressing concern that obsolete Cold War requirements 
may continue to influence doctrine and equipment procurement programs in the U.S. 
Army.  If “today’s capability portfolio” is based on traditional warfare, then a better 
understanding of how that portfolio emerged will determine whether “traditional 
challenges” continue to influence current Army transformation.   
In The Masks of War, Carl Builder argues the Army’s dominant conception of war 
originates from its finest hours in the last year of World War II.  He states, “In self-
imagery, nothing the Army has done since, in Korea or Vietnam, can compare with who 
it was and what it was doing from June 1944 to May 1945.”18  Builder believes the power 
of this institutional memory continues to influence the Army’s doctrinal preferences for 
tanks and artillery despite the possibility this focus may not be suited for emerging 
challenges.   
 To explore the influence of traditional conceptions of war, this chapter considers 
the U.S. Army's doctrinal developments following the Vietnam War through the 
development of current AirLand Battle Doctrine.  This period involves significant 
changes in the social, political, and strategic environment facing the planner: the failure 
in Vietnam, the end of the draft, the end of the Cold War, success in the first Gulf War, 
and the development of new Army doctrine during a period of uncertainty.  The 
institutional mindset that evolved during latter half of the Cold War emphasized 
traditional challenges.  Doctrine during this period provides a context to examine current 
developments.  This context is necessary to consider the notion that military institutions 
have a distinct culture that may create a bias toward the development of particular 
doctrines that are unsuited for contemporary challenges.  The analysis of past Army 
doctrine will center on field manuals, equipment procurement, personnel systems, and 
training. 
                                                 
18 Carl Builder. The Masks of War. A RAND Corporation Research Study. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1989),   132. 
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A. POST-VIETNAM ARMY AND ORIGINS OF TRADITIONAL WARFARE  
 Military institutions have always preferred to fight on familiar terms.  This 
phenomenon has taken shape in different forms throughout history.  During the Vietnam 
War, a frustrated commanding Army General stated, “I will be damned if I will permit 
the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine and its traditions to be destroyed just to win 
this lousy war.”19  The Vietnam War, however, was not the first time warriors faced a 
form of fighting they did not prefer.  Robert O’Connell observed this phenomenon in the 
Iliad, when Diomedes addresses Paris with the following passage:     
You archer, foul fighter, lovely in your locks, eyer of young girls.  If you 
were to make trial of me in strong combat with (traditional) weapons, your 
bow would do you no good at all.20 
 
If Paris is placed in the context of the recent QDR, then he would likely fall into the 
category of “irregular challenges.”  Diomedes claim, on the other hand, expresses the 
cultural attitude behind “traditional warfare” during his time.  For Diomedes, traditional 
warfare involved close armored combat.  Another character from the Iliad, Idomeneus, 
reinforces this attitude by stating, “My way is not to make my battles standing far away 
from my enemies.”21  At the beginning of the 20th Century, these preferences experienced 
a violent reversal.22  Modern weapons can strike targets at a global range with 
devastating effect.  Cultural attitudes of military institutions have shifted full circle, 
embracing the technological possibilities of fighting at a distance.  During Vietnam, 
however, extensive bombardment by aircraft and artillery did not bring victory.  For the 
U.S. Army, failure in Vietnam haunted the traditional essence of the warrior, having 
                                                 
19 Keith Johnson. “Mission Impossible.” Time Magazine. (8 February 1971),   1; It is also quoted, but 
with a different wording, in Michael Maclear. “Westy’s War.” The Ten Thousand Day War. (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1981),   195; It has the same wording as the older quotation in The New American Militarism by 
Andrew Bacevich,   37. 
20 Robert O’Connell. Of Arms and Men. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),   48. 
21 Ibid.,. 
22 Jonathan B.A. Bailey.  “The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare.” The Dynamics of 
Military Revolution, 1300-2050. Ed. Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray. (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Even with the widespread adoption of firearms in the 17th 
Century, fighting still occurred at visual range, with a return to linear formations developed by military 
reformers who were inspired by reading Vegetius.  From: Michael Roberts. “The Military Revolution, 
1560-1660.” The Military Revolution Debate. Ed. Clifford Rogers. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995),   
14.  
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experienced defeat by an adversary that remained distant, yet occasionally offered battle 
at a fiercely close range.  Although weapons have evolved since Homer wrote the Iliad, 
the attitudes and psychology behind them remain influential for military institutions.   
In 1976, the Army’s capstone doctrinal manual stated, “All great armies of the 
world rest their land combat power upon the tank.”23  This manual initiated a process of 
doctrinal reforms aimed at restoring the Army’s confidence in the aftermath of the 
Vietnam War.24  Armies have always sought to combine striking power, mobility, and 
protection.25  The tank served as the quintessential weapon system, through the promise 
that these capabilities could merge in one platform, reinforcing traditional cultural 
conceptions of war.  The attitudes behind various weapon systems and their employment 
fall into functional categories.  These categories are the medium through which military 
culture is preserved.26  Tradition becomes an impediment to modernization when military 
culture stabilizes these functional categories to a degree that impedes the optimization of 
new technology.27   
Since the inception of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff position in 1903, only five 
officers from the artillery branch have served in the position, while 25 originated from 
                                                 
23 Department of the Army.  FM 100-5, Operations.  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1976),   2-2. 
24 Ironically, at the time this was written, the conventional North Vietnamese Army rumbled through 
South Vietnam with columns of Soviet-made T-34 tanks, thereby uniting the country under their control.   
25 Michael Roberts. “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660.” The Military Revolution Debate. Ed. 
Clifford Rogers. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995),   13. 
26 O’Connell,   7. 
27 For these reasons, the U.S. Army is currently undergoing a “transformation” of its functional 
categories.  This transformation consists of changes in the personnel system as well as the development of 
the Future Combat System.  Personnel changes include mergers between similar traditional branch 
functions into various categories such as maneuver, fires, effects, logistics, and maneuver support.  
Maneuver will consist of infantry, aviation, and armor branches.  Fires will consist of field artillery and air 
defense artillery branches.  Logistics will consist of transportation, ordinance, and quartermaster branches.  
Maneuver support will consist of engineer, chemical, and military police branches.  Source: Human 
Resources Command. https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/opmd/Branch_Homepages.htm. Accessed on 
21 Feb 08. 
 11
the armor (cavalry) and infantry branches.28  Regardless, all three branches, through a 
“fraternal relationship,” involving mutual turf protection, hold power over the Army, and 
promote a unified view of conventional combined arms operations.29  Social, political, 
technological, and strategic factors affect the development of doctrine, yet these 
considerations first pass through a powerful cultural medium before emerging in U.S. 
Army doctrine. 
It is no mere coincidence that the Army changed its slogan three times during the 
1970s and used three different slogans in the current decade.30  Rapidly changing mottos 
are a sure sign of crisis.  After Vietnam, the Army restored its confidence with a renewed 
focus on conventional doctrine and new equipment.  The threat of Warsaw Pact forces in 
Europe legitimized the Army’s avoidance of counterinsurgency during the 1970s.  In 
contrast, after the current war in Iraq, it is unlikely that a similar conventional threat will 
emerge to allow the Army to ignore developing full spectrum capabilities.  Yet the 
absence of a competitor that might pose a significant conventional threat does not imply 
that the Army can overcome the institutional inertia that some have argued characterizes 
its preoccupation with conventional operations. 
B. SOURCES OF U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE 
The U.S. Army can trace its doctrinal origins to Jomini's principle of "offensive 
action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to 
lead to victory."31  The United States Military Academy translated Jomini's book, The Art 
                                                 
28 The first two Chiefs of Staff from the artillery branch served during World War I, but this did not 
occur again until William Westmoreland.  Other notable exceptions: General Erik Shinseki served in the 
artillery as a Lieutenant, but later switched to Armor (Cavalry) as a Captain.  In contrast, General Peter 
Schoomaker served in Armor initially, switching to a career in Special Forces as a Captain.  Source: 
William Gardner Bell. Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2005.  (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Army Center of Military History, 2005). At: http://www.history.army.mil/books/cg%26csa/CG-
TOC.htm. 
29 Builder,   189. 
30 In 1971 the Army's slogan was "Today's Army Wants To Join You," in 1973, "Join The People 
Who've Joined The Army," in 1978, "This Is The Army," in 1981, "Be All That You Can Be," in 2001, 
"Army Of One," and in 2006, "Army Strong."  Source: Mary Kate Chambers and David Verdum.  "Army 
Recruiting Messages Help Keep the Army Rolling Along." United States Army News.  (09 October 2006)  
At: http://www.army.mil/-news/2006/10/09/322-army-recruiting-messages-help-keep-army-rolling-along/ 
31 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005),   17.  
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of War, in 1862.  The preface to this edition states "As the existence of a large, well-
instructed standing army is deemed incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the 
more important that military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the 
people."32  This statement reveals that U.S. Army officers sought Jomini's principles and 
clung to them ever so tightly due to American political constraints on maintaining a 
professional army.  This was the motivation for West Point to translate the work in the 
first place.  Once the constraints on the maintenance of a standing army were removed, 
the U.S. Army began to fully embrace Jominian notions of warfare. 
Because Jomini's reputation was later surpassed by that of Clausewitz, army 
doctrine is often incorrectly attributed to Clausewitz.33   Both Clausewitz and Jomini 
mention the importance of being strong at some "decisive point."  However, Jomini 
writes of massing at the "decisive point" in absolute terms, while Clausewitz says "the 
principle of concentration will not have the same results in every war," and additionally 
points out that "the best strategy is always to be very strong."34  Jomini's scientific 
framework often appeals to those desiring a quick and cheap victory, while the latter 
statements of Clausewitz allude to the complexity of war and are difficult to incorporate 
into a rigid doctrine.  The development of modern maneuver warfare theory is attributed 
to Jomini’s principles.35  Jomini's work was already widely read and disseminated during 
the period examined, while a good English translation of Clausewitz did not exist until 
shortly after the Vietnam War in 1976.36     
The U.S. Army's conservative interpretation of the 1976 translation of On War is 
best epitomized in retired Army Colonel Harry Summers book On Strategy: A Critical 
                                                 
 32 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini. The Art of War. (J.P Lippincott & Co.: Philadelphia, 1862),   xii 
33 Clausewitz's famous work was published after his death by his widow, and did not exist in English 
until 1874. 
34 Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976),  204. 
35 Robert Leonhard. The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle. (New York: 
Ballantine Publishing Group, 1991). 
36 Clausewitz. On War;  Also: Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English.  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994)  Although a previous version of the work existed in English and was in print by 
Penguin Books, it was never very popular among military officers or on the curriculum of CGSC or the 
Army War College. 
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Analysis of the Vietnam War.37  This book started as a study commissioned by the Army 
War College on the "lessons learned" in Vietnam, and eventually became required 
reading in courses that were part of the curriculum at the Army War College as well as 
the counterpart Air Force and Navy institutions.38  In this book, Summers concludes that 
the Vietnam War was lost because politicians did not fully mobilize national resources, 
and military leaders overemphasized counterinsurgency by way of attacking the Viet 
Cong (VC) insurgents rather than emphasizing the destruction of the conventional North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA).  Ironically, the appeal of this book at the Army War College 
suggests that the institution uses On War to reinforce its conservative belief that success 
(or full-spectrum dominance) is possible by using Jominian principles to destroy enemy 
forces in the field.  Furthermore, the institution misuses the idea that politics permeates 
war at all levels to imply that failure in war is the fault of politicians interfering with the 
conduct of war at all levels rather than the experts who flawlessly conduct war based on 
Jomini's principles. 
1. Maneuver Without Movement: Tactical Attrition 
Maneuver warfare, as a strategy, is characteristic of the weaker side, as it seeks to 
attain a position of advantage, from a position of overall disadvantage.  Attritional 
strategy, on the other hand, is characteristic of the side that is confident it possesses 
greater depth of resources.  The concept of maneuver becomes confusing in a situation 
where the position is attained through firepower, without continual movement.  This type 
of situation is one of tactical attrition, where the enemy is worn down with firepower 
from positions of advantage.  This differs from an attritional strategy, and is actually a 
 
 
                                                 
37 Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 
1982). 
38 Christina Fishback.  “U.S. Army’s Reaction to FM 100-5.” Master’s Thesis Draft. (Manhattan: 
Kansas State University, 2008),   92. 
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form of maneuver warfare.39  Planners blurred these concepts during Vietnam, and the 
term “attrition” became unpopular in defense circles afterwards, though it remained the 
basis for tactical doctrine.   
Maneuver and attrition ideas are influential because the Army was historically 
small in peacetime yet expeditionary in wartime due to the implied limitations of the 
Constitution and the geographic isolation of the nation.  The last time the U.S. Army 
fought on American soil was during the Civil War.  Starting with the Spanish American 
War in 1898, the U.S. Army has fought its wars overseas and depended on a 
technological advantage in firepower.40  These factors created a necessity for the use of 
strategic maneuver and tactical attrition.  The U.S. Army developed an attritional doctrine 
throughout most of the Cold War, because such a doctrine called for less manpower.  
This was complemented by plans for rapid deployment of reserves and allied 
mobilization in the event of a European theater war with the Soviet Union.  The 
attritional mindset of the U.S. Army is evident it its doctrine with the 3:1 rule, which 
originates from Lanchester’s square laws, a series of differential equations developed in 
1916, relating to the theoretically appropriate attacker to defender ratios with the advent 
                                                 
39 The concept has grown from and emphasis on physically massing forces to instead massing fires, 
from decentralized positions.  Today, the emphasis is on massing the effects of fires rather than the fires 
themselves, with “effects based operations.” 
40 Donald Dyal. Historical Dictionary of the Spanish American War. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1996). 
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of modern artillery.41  Using this ratio, Army doctrine assumed that a small force could 
defend from an attack against a force three times its own size, with the proper use of 
artillery.  These ideas relate to conventional defensive situations, and may not apply in 
other situations.   
In an offensive situation involving seizing and holding terrain, indirect firepower 
cannot serve as the main effort.  The military relied on massive amounts of artillery and 
the use of airpower in Vietnam.  During one operation, 366,000 rounds of artillery, 
combined with 3,235 tons of bombs were used to kill 1,776 Viet Cong.42  This amounted 
to a ratio of around three tons of bombs combined with 206 artillery rounds to kill one 
enemy soldier.43  Many of these bombs and shells, (5% and 2% respectively) did not 
explode.44  Ironically, during the same time frame as the operation, 6,071 American 
casualties were attributed to mines and booby traps made using unexploded American 
ordinance.45  U.S. Army doctrine during the Vietnam called for wearing down the enemy 
by leveraging the advantages of firepower.  This was a flawed application of doctrine 
actually intended for defending Europe from Soviet aggression.  The European theater fit 
with the Army’s conceptions of war.  The Vietnam War, however, served as a temporary 
distraction from the Army’s preoccupation with conventional operations.  
                                                 
41 Stephen Biddle. Military Power.    17.  Biddle is critical of Lanchester's formula because it does not 
account for the manner in which forces are employed and how non-material factors can influence battle.  
Although Abraham Lincoln also mentioned such a ratio during the Civil War, such a rigid “rule” was not 
institutionalized until after Lanchester.  His formulas provided a framework by militaries sought to employ 
modern artillery, continue to be used in systems engineering.  Ultimately, war is a complex and chaotic 
endeavor, and such rigid rules cannot apply.  Biddle argues that success and failure in modern war is a 
factor of the modern system of “force employment” rather than one of technology.  He traces various 
perspectives that explain how armies were able to overcome the advent of modern firepower that rained 
upon the battlefields of World War I.  With modern firepower, the defense of NATO hinged upon the idea 
of the 3:1 Rule, involving the ratio of attackers necessary to defeat defenders.  In Assessing the 
Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and its Critics, John Mearsheimer points out that the troop quality and 
the numbers and quality of weapons are not compared in the development of the rule. 
42 During Operation JUNCTION CITY (February -May 1967).  See: Andrew Krepinevich. The Army 
and Vietnam. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),   190-191. 
43 3,235 divided by 1,776 and 366,000 divided by 1,776. 
44 Krepinevich,   201 
45 Ibid. 
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C. FIELD MANUALS 
The 1976 version of FM 100-5 Operations, became known as Active Defense.46  
The opening pages of this manual purposefully orients the Army on a conventional fight 
in Europe with the following: "Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw 
Pact is the most demanding mission the US Army could be assigned."47  Active Defense 
incorporated views on new technology from 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and argued that the 
Army needed new weapons to keep pace with advances in modern warfare.48  The 
manual stated, “to win, our soldiers need the best weapons that industry and technology 
can provide."49  An entire chapter of the manual was devoted to a description of modern 
weapons.50  This chapter used elaborate graphs to depict trends in modern war that would 
require new tanks, artillery, infantry carriers, air defense, and helicopters in order to be 
successful.  The Army believed the weapons it possessed were inadequate, and the 
defensive nature of the doctrine was based on the idea that the Army did not yet possess 
the weaponry it needed to respond to a Soviet aggression with a counter-offensive.  
 Given this consideration, the doctrine stated that the "United States could find 
itself in a short, intense war" whose outcome would be decided so fast that "the US Army 
must, above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war."51  Additionally, the 
manual stated that the Army must "prepare to fight outnumbered and win.”52  To do this, 
several concepts were introduced, such as the idea of trading space for time, using tactical 
nuclear weapons, and the idea that "the skillful commander substitutes firepower for 
manpower whenever he can do so."53  This idea is fundamental to how the U.S. Army 
pursued reforms during the Cold War, starting with the development of tactical nuclear 
                                                 
46 James Dunnigan  and Raymond Macedonia. Getting it Right:  American Military Reforms after 
Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond.  (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1993),   122. 
47 FM 100-5 Operations. (1976),   1-2. 
48 Saul Bronfeld. “Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army.” 
Journal of Military History. Vol. 71 (April 2007),  465-498. 
49 Department of the Army. FM 100-5 Operations.  (1976),   1-3. 
50FM 100-5 (1976), Chapter 2. 
51 Ibid.,   1. 
52 Ibid,   1-3. 
53 Ibid.,   3-4. 
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weapons during the 1950s.  The problem with this idea is that it ignores the political 
aspects of war, and reduces institutional thought on how to conduct war as nothing more 
than a “targeting drill” that can be refined through the fields of engineering and 
operations research.54  While such fields play a vital role for military institutions, they 
can only be useful if directed towards relevant objectives rather than by trying to find 
ways to optimize the attritional-based targeting methodology that originates from 
formulas developed in 1916.   
Criticisms of the 1976 doctrine were numerous.  Its author, General DePuy, spent 
most of his time defending the doctrine from its critics.55  Critics centered on the idea that 
the doctrine was too passive in nature, and that it focused only on winning the first battle 
of a war in a country so small (West Germany), that losing two battles would likely result 
in the loss of the entire country.56  It seemed that no one was satisfied with the doctrine, 
and it served to spark an intense debate about doctrine that culminated in a new doctrine 
six years later.57  Many of the criticisms of the doctrine must be viewed in light of the 
political situation of the time.  American foreign policy during the 1970s was in a period 
of détente.  Also, the aftermath of Vietnam and the resulting domestic politics created 
constrained defense budgets.  Relative to foreign policy and domestic constraints, the 
only feasible doctrinal option for the Army was one that called for “fighting 
outnumbered.”58        
The 1982 version of Operations became known as AirLand Battle.59  It 
introduced the idea of deep attacks beyond the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) to 
disrupt enemy second echelons.60  Because it was more offensive in nature, it received 
less criticism from within the U.S. Army, while causing some initial controversy and 
                                                 
54 Frederick Kagan. Finding the Target. (New York: Encounter Books, 2006),   359 
55 Ibid.,   57. 
56 Dunnigan and Macedonia,   126. 
57 Fishback,   3.  The 1976 manual was the starting point for professional interest in doctrine for the 
United States Army on a level that was not present before.  
58 Dunnigan and Macedonia,   128. 
59 Kagan,   59. 
60 Department of the Army.  FM 100-5 Operations.  (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1982). 
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confusion with Germany and other NATO allies.61  The offensive nature of the 1982 
doctrine was evident with the reintegration of chemical and nuclear weapons into the 
deep attack plan.62  
The 1986 version of AirLand Battle was mostly the same as the 1982 version, but 
with one exception.  It introduced the term "Follow-On Forces Attack" or FOFA, with the 
idea that these forces should be attacked simultaneously by air forces and new artillery 
systems.63  This manual marked an intersection with an Air Force doctrine that called for 
striking targets deep in enemy territory, and Army doctrine that called for striking targets 
closer to the forward line of troops (FLOT).  Attacking the FOFA was not only a physical 
target that could be agreed upon by the Air Force and Army, but an intellectual point of 
convergence for advocates of air power (strategic bombing) and land power.  If nothing 
else, it was true to its name.     
The offensive characteristics of AirLand battle concerned German allies because 
some critics believed it heightened the probability of war by calling for “deep attacks.”64  
These attacks appeared pre-emptive in nature from the German perspective.65  The 
preemptive nature of a defense based upon AirLand Battle doctrine was mistaken by 
some as a strategically offensive posture.  Since the end of World War II, the Germans 
continually feared that increasing American-Soviet tensions in some other part of world 
might trigger a conflict in Europe.66  AirLand Battle only served to increase the fears of 
Germans concerned with this possibility because it called for “deep attacks,” in the 
opening stages of a conflict.  These fears must be understood in light of the fact that the 
Germans also were suspicious of the defensive nature of Active Defense, and its idea of 
 
 
                                                 
61 Kagan,  61-65.   
62 Kagan,   60; Robert A. Monson, “Star Wars and AirLand Battle: Technology, Strategy, and Politics 
in German-American Relations.” German Studies Review. Vol. 9, No. 3. (October 1986),   621. 
63 FM 100-5 (1986). 
64 Monson,   619. 
65 Ibid,   622. 
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“trading space for time.”67  This is because the “space” NATO traded in a potential 
conflict with the Soviets may well have been the whole country of Germany and parts of 
France.68     
 Army reforms after Vietnam were driven by the desire to win the first battle of the 
next war.  This highlights a tendency think of war as a single battle, and Army field 
manuals after Vietnam stated the importance of the first battle, without mention of what 
happens afterwards.  This emphasis was due to the fear and uncertainty of nuclear 
escalation.  Loss of the first battle in a Cold War scenario would immediately lead to a 
choice between nuclear war or capitulation, based on war plans at the time.69  Naturally, 
the Army did not want to face either outcome, so it focused only on first battle scenarios 
in traditional conventional operations.   
 This focus was further encouraged by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis.  
Based on analysis of Soviet ammunition stockpiles and logistics assets the CIA predicted 
conditions that might lead to a stalemate if the U.S. Army could prevent or repel a Soviet 
breakthrough for a period of 14 days.70  This time would allow NATO mobilization, and 
the possibility of a situation resembling that of World War I.  The threat of stalemate may 
seem as a defeatist goal for an army, but if this possibility deterred war with the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, then it served its purpose, while clinging loosely to 
American democratic beliefs regarding the political dangers of standing armies.  At the 
end of World War II, the U.S. Army demobilized, in accordance with democratic 
traditions.  Yet the threat posed by the Soviet Army remained after the war, and required 
a rapid mobilization in the event of Soviet aggression.     
                                                 
67 FM 100-5 (1976),   6-3. “A commander can trade space for time, or he can trade time for risk.” 
68 Interestingly, the doctrine of Active Defense was borrowed almost entirely from the German 
doctrine of Panzergrenadier.  See: Kagan,   55. 
69 Colin Powell. My American Journey. (New York: Random House, 1996),   313.  Planners intended 
the Vogelsberg Mountain Range to be last defensible position, after which the Soviets were to be attacked 
by Lance missiles and artillery fired atomic projectiles. 
70 Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. “Trends and Developments in 
Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s.” National Intelligence Estimate, Key 
Judgments and Executive Summary. (14 November 1989),   9.  This section indicated that the Soviets could 
only sustain combat operations for 30-45 days, provided NATO could seal off or prevent a breakthrough 
for a period of 14 days.   At this point, the Soviets would have to move stocks from the strategic reserve.  
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 This mobilization was practiced annually with REFORGER (from REturn of 
FORces to GERmany) exercises, and entailed the rapid deployment of multiple heavy 
brigades to Germany.71  These exercises involved the Military Airlift Command, Military 
Sealift Command, as well as the Civilian Reserve Airfleet.72  In the event of war with the 
Soviets, the REFORGER exercise would become OPERATION REFORGER,   with the 
goal of moving “ten divisions to Europe in ten days.”73  The name of the exercise implies 
that forces should have never left Germany following World War II, instead continuing a 
preventive attack against the Soviet Union immediately after defeating Nazi Germany, 
while still mobilized.74  These exercises continued after the Cold War, until April 1993.75  
They served to focus planners on rapid deployment requirements and first battle 
scenarios, in accordance with a doctrine that called for winning the first battle of a 
potential war.      
 The inability to think about what happens after the first battle has grave 
consequences.  This preoccupation remains in today’s doctrine, under circumstances 
different from that of the Cold War.  Given a defensive strategy, it may have been helpful 
to plan on holding out for 14 days in order to deter Soviet aggression by the threat of 
stalemate, but when invading a country in order to replace its government, it becomes 
necessary to plan beyond 14 days.  When repelling an invader from Kuwait, however, 
AirLand Battle was ideal.  Planning considerations learned from REFOGER exercises 
were useful, though it required significant time to deploy heavy forces to Saudi Arabia in 
1990.  Nevertheless, AirLand Battle doctrine received only minor changes after Desert 
Storm.      
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 The 1993 version of FM 100-5 Operations proudly declared AirLand Battle 
doctrine a success, and found new reasons to continue the focus on rapid deployment and 
decisive Jominan notions of war.  The 1993 version was basically the same as the 1986 
manual, but with the addition of a chapter entitled, “Operations Other Than War.”76  This 
chapter concluded that “winning wars” was the Army’s primary mission, and “operations 
other than war” can be accomplished with the same “leadership, organization, equipment, 
discipline, and skills gained in training for war.”77  As a result of the success with 
AirLand Battle doctrine during Desert Storm, this manual stated, “The American people 
expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties.  They prefer quick resolution of 
conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions 
not be met.”78  Lawrence Freedman argues this presumption created problems for the 
Army in Kosovo.  He describes the manifestation of casualty aversion during operations 
in Kosovo:  
US troops stayed, separated from the society which they were supposed to 
help calm, in a guarded and well-appointed compound, while the troops of 
allies intermingled with the local population.79   
 
Ultimately, the Army’s problems in Kosovo inspired a dramatic transformation effort.  
To support this transformation, TRADOC decided to change the nomenclature of the 
Operations series manuals.  The Army received the new manual and new headgear on the 
same day.   
 On June 14, 2001, the Army’s Birthday, FM 3-0 Operations was introduced, 
accompanied by the black beret.  Rapid deployment units typically wear this form of 
headgear, and its purpose was to emphasize that the entire Army would “transform” so 
that it could deploy more rapidly.  Additionally, FM 3-0 Operations mentioned “full-
spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war,” in the preface rather 
than the 13th Chapter.  Although this manual included a chapter entitled, “Stability 
                                                 
76 Department of the Army. FM 100-5 Operations. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1993),   13-0. 
77 Ibid., 13-8 
78 Ibid.,   1-3. 
79 Lawrence Freedman. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. The Adelphi Papers. Vol. 45. No. 
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Operations,” it was basically the same as previous manuals, but with the addition of the 
words “full-spectrum” in front of the older concepts throughout the manual.  The 
foreword of the manual, written by General Eric Shinseki, stated:  
Warfighting, and by extension less violent actions, depends on a few, 
“rules of thumb.”  First, we win on the offense; we must be able to defend 
well, but you win on the offense.  Next, we want to initiate combat on our 
own terms – at a time, in a place, and a method of our own choosing – not 
our adversary’s, our choosing.80 
      
This statement reinforced Jominian notions of warfare, and was no different from what 
Diomedes told Paris in the Iliad, 2,700 years ago.   
D. EQUIPMENT 
Today’s policymakers are constrained by the military capabilities developed 
during the period after Vietnam because the capabilities necessary for occupying territory 
are very different than those required for the destruction enemy forces in the field.81  
Pursuing armor protection while substituting firepower for manpower creates limits on 
the types of political objectives that can be accomplished with a doctrine and associated 
force structure.  Current attempts to reform the Army rely on a doctrine of long-range 
precision firepower and highly mobile armored forces.  These developments are 
strikingly reminiscent of changes that occurred after Vietnam as evident in the “Big Five” 
weapon systems. 
The conceptualization of the “Big Five,” weapon systems (Abrams, Bradley, 
Apache, Blackhawk, and Patriot) took place during the 1970s.82  TRADOC’s doctrine 
called for the development of these weapons.  During the Reagan years, funding for the 
“Big Five” increased.83  The Abrams tank came first.  After several unsuccessful 
                                                 
80 Department of the Army. FM 3-0 Operations. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
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programs in the 1970s, the new tank arrived to battalions by 1980.84  The next year, the 
Bradley was introduced, because the obsolete M113s infantry vehicles could not keep up 
with the new tank.  The Apache added a capability for Army aviation to attack deeper 
beyond the FEBA in accordance with the new doctrine.  The Patriot was designed to 
defend the airspace by shooting down aircraft with missiles.  This would theoretically 
allow friendly aircraft operate at the front lines, although air defense doctrine called for 
shooting everything out of the sky in a high-intensity scenario.85   
In response to Active Defense and AirLand Battle doctrines, the Army’s field 
artillery branch sought to increase its ability for both close range fire support and deep 
strikes. The 1977 decision to put fire support teams (FIST) at the company level 
demonstrates the Army’s desire to better direct fires at close ranges.  In addition to the 
FIST concept, division artillery increased from fifty-four to ninety-six 155-mm. self-
propelled howitzers.86  At longer ranges, the development of Q-36 and Q-37 radars 
combined with the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the Multiple Launch 
Rocket System (MLRS) increased the capability of the Army’s artillery in the deep 
attack.87  Counterbattery radars (Firefinder II) could identify enemy fires up to thirty-six 
kilometers away and transmit this information, via fire direction control centers, to 
mobile MLRS and howitzer batteries.88  MLRS was designed to replace the Lance 
missile system, and was required to “use less manpower and have conventional and 
nuclear capabilities,” according to the official history of the U.S. Army Field Artillery 
Branch.89     
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E. PERSONNEL SYSTEM 
The personnel system used by military forces has great influence on the 
development of military doctrine.  In The Sources of Military Doctrine Barry Posen 
points out how the shift in the terms of conscription from three years to one year in the 
French Army prior to World War II caused a shift in focus from offensive operations to a 
focus on the defensive, which is best illustrated by the construction of the Maginot 
Lines.90  This phenomenon is based on the idea that offensive operations require 
extensive training that can only be conducted with a personnel system that allows for 
more permanent assignment of soldiers.   
With this line of reasoning, Richard Lock-Pullan argues that the end of the draft 
in 1973 was the most significant influence on the development of U.S. Army doctrine 
thereafter.91  The end of the draft allowed the military to train its personnel extensively in 
the tactics necessary for the employment of modern weaponry.  The doctrine initially 
developed in 1976 was very controversial because it was passive in nature and eventually 
resulted in the more offensive Air-Land Battle doctrine, which was developed in the 
1980s and brought success in the offensive phases of both wars in Iraq.92  The U.S. 
Army's current focus on offensive conventional operations is due to the influence of 
Jomini and a belief that success is only possible by taking the offensive.  This manner of 
thinking may work against counterinsurgency objectives.   The end of the draft provided 
an opportunity for extensive training in counterinsurgency due to personnel stability, but 
such an opportunity was instead used to reinforce capability for offensive conventional 
operations, given the threat posed by the Soviet Army.     
The American political tradition has been one that is highly suspicious of 
maintaining a large standing army, and subscribes to the belief that the "citizen soldier" 
can triumph.  After World War II, however, there was a significant shift in such thinking.  
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This institutional shift was reinforced after Vietnam by perceptions on the changing 
nature of modern warfare and the fact that using firepower, mechanization, and 
technology requires professional expertise and training that could no longer be expected 
from draftees.    
In 2004, retired Marine Colonel Thomas Hammes wrote a popular book called 
The Sling and the Stone in which he argued that "4th generation warfare" was a new 
development in warfare resulting from society's transition from the "industrial age" to the 
"information age."93  His ideas call for a defense policy that would spend more on people 
and training rather than technology by arguing that success in future conflict would 
depend more on the human element.  Three decades prior to Hammes’ book, U.S. Army 
doctrine in 1976 provided a different interpretation of this transition by stating that being 
"accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population brought to 
bear after the onset of hostilities" was no longer relevant because future wars would be 
decided by existing forces during the initial phases of conflict due to advances in modern 
weaponry.94  U.S. Army officers developed these ideas by observing the 1973 Arab 
Israeli War, but they are also reflective of the belief that it had become politically 
impossible to mobilize American society for war as a result of Vietnam. 
 During Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson refused to mobilize the National 
Guard and Reserves despite the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.95  This advice was 
politically motivated, and given several years into the Vietnam War.  The Army began 
the war quite confident that it could win with a small force.  After the war, however, the 
Army leadership clung to the notion that the war was lost because politicians did not fully 
garner the national resources necessary to conduct the war.  In any case, many of those 
that volunteered for service in the Reserves during Vietnam, were only doing so to avoid 
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the draft.  This created a “repository” for those that did not want to be involved in the 
war, thus affecting the quality the Reserve component in a manner that would have to be 
addressed during reforms.96 
In 1971, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird outlined a concept that would include 
both active and reserve components of the military as a part of the total force.  General 
Creighton Abrams adopted this idea in 1973, and by 1974, critical units in the National 
Guard and Army Reserve were paired with active units in order to "round out" the active 
Army.97  This made it difficult for the President to deploy the Army without calling up 
the reserves.  The idea of having to “round out” units would theoretically force the 
political issue of mobilization prior to the decision to commit the U. S. Army in a future 
conflict.  This would create a political trip-wire for Presidents, lest they be tempted to 
rely on a professional army to embark upon adventures that lacked authentic popular 
backing.  It was forgotten, however, that the Vietnam War had popular backing when it 
began, and that the Army initially believed it could win with a small force. 
 When the Total Force concept was applied to an all-volunteer army, an 
unexpected phenomenon occurred.  With the end of the draft, the level of professionalism 
in the active duty Army increased.  This created tension with the Total Force Concept, 
however, because Army could not rely on amateurs or reservists as a vital component of 
ground combat formations without additional training.  This is evident in the Gulf War 
where much of Army Reserve artillery was not cleared to fire “live rounds in proximity 
to actual troops.”98  Another example is that of the 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia 
National Guard.  This unit never deployed to the Gulf War, and spent the entire duration 
of its mobilization at the National Training Center, where army trainers found the brigade 
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so ill-prepared that its commander was relieved.99  Decisions made during the 1970s 
impact the current war in Iraq because nearly 40% of all troops in Iraq during 2004 were 
from the National Guard or Reserves, combined with a significant portion of civilian 
contractors.100 
Initially, the Army did not react positively to the end of the draft because it 
believed that sufficient manpower could not be generated without a draft.  In 1975, 
former Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland stated that “the all-volunteer force 
has not produced the military posture required.”101  Donald Rumsfeld served as Secretary 
of Defense for the Gerald R. Ford administration during this time and oversaw the 
transition to an all-volunteer Army while simultaneously seeking to reverse what he saw 
as a 15-20 year trend in the relative decline of U.S. conventional forces.102  By the time 
of the thirty-year anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force, President George W. Bush 
proclaimed it as being fundamental to increasing the effectiveness of the military.103  The 
end of the draft changed the social foundation of the Army, however, and caused a long-
term shift in its identity.104  This shift in identity had the consequence of solidifying the 
Army’s dependence on indirect firepower and armor protection.  The weapon systems 
developed after Vietnam came to require a certain level of training, professionalism, and 
competence that may not have been possible in an army of conscripts.  As the 
professionalism increased, highly trained soldiers have become the most valuable 
component of the institution.   
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F. TRAINING REFORMS 
While new doctrines evolved after Vietnam, the emphasis on training also 
continued to increase.  Leadership and training were not ignored in a period where the 
Army relied on massive volumes of indirect fires.  In fact, the growing reliance on 
firepower increased the need for advanced training because of the growing complexity of 
modern firepower. 
In 1986, the book America's First Battles by Charles Heller was published.  The 
central theme in this book was that America had consistently lost the first battle of every 
major war it has been involved.105  The book quickly gained prominence among 
members of an institution that believed it could not afford to lose the first battle of the 
next war.106  This was a profound change in the outlook of officers in the U.S. Army.  
The idea that a nation must win the first battle of a war or lose altogether represents an 
outlook that is very different from one that relies on the weight of industrial mobilization.  
Such an idea asserts that tactical excellence must make up for some kind of perceived 
economic (as evident with Germany and Japan during World War II) or geographic 
(Israel) weakness.  The source of the Army’s current emphasis on tactical excellence 
originates from a perception of weakness regarding the end of the draft, and resultant 
personnel system.  In the conclusion of America’s First Battles, John Shy writes that a 
lack of training and experience may result in losing first battles.  He points out that the 
central problem of a “democratic society that has never been sympathetic to the 
occupation of the soldier,” is one of generating enough manpower with the technical 
skills necessary to employ sophisticated weaponry upon the outbreak of modern war.107        
The creation of the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training 
Center (JRTC), and Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) illustrated a trend of 
increased training for the army.  Training and Doctrine Command was very influential in 
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the training revolution of the Army.  As Deputy Chief of Staff and Training at TRADOC, 
General Paul Gorman conceptualized the National Training Center as well as numerous 
training reforms that established highly realistic training.108  Several accounts of 
successful performance during Desert Storm were attributed more so to the training 
revolution than to the Army’s new weapons.109  General Barry McCaffrey went so far as 
to say: “U.S. Forces in Desert Storm could have won the conflict decisively even if they 
had swapped their equipment with the Iraqi military.”110  He was implying that the actual 
“revolution in military affairs” was based on people (training and leadership) rather than 
technology.111  In any case, the Army that was successful during Desert Storm was born 
from reforms during the 1970s and 1980s.   
Recent events, such as the end of the draft in 1973, and the success of an all-
volunteer force during Desert Storm impact the current development of U.S. Army 
doctrine and its emphasis towards precision firepower, protection through increased 
situational awareness, and rapid deployment.  One of the most influential factors on U.S. 
Army doctrine is the fact that its personnel system requires doctrines that compensate for 
a lack of manpower.  Maneuver warfare theories can accommodate for this constraint.  
The idea that these doctrines are irrelevant for the types of missions that the Army is 
currently asked to perform does not alter the course of institutional inertia.     
After the Korean War, the Army developed a doctrine that theoretically allowed it 
to fight on a nuclear battlefield with less manpower by using tactical nuclear weapons to 
halt the advances of the Warsaw Pact in a potential conflict.112  After Vietnam, the Army 
called for the development of a new generation of conventional weapons that would take 
advantage of modern technological advances to fight outnumbered.  Today, the Army 
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may be attempting to do the same with its “Future Combat System,” which is based on 
the idea that “Information Age” technology can reduce manpower.  
G. CONCLUSION 
 The haunting institutional memories of Korea and Vietnam were temporarily put 
to rest by the Army’s performance during Desert Storm.  Shortly after this redeeming 
experience, however, the Army found itself incapable of performing the tasks that 
politicians demanded.   Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, a seemingly peace-
minded person, best captures politicians’ frustration with the Army’s vision of itself, and 
its institutional reluctance to do their bidding.  In 1996, she asks former General Colin 
Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we 
can't use it?"113  This statement angered Powell, who was haunted by memories of 
piecemeal (un-Jominian) commitment in Vietnam.  Madeline Albright was referring to 
the Army’s reluctance to conduct peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.  Inevitably, the 
Army interpreted these concerns as a matter of how to “lighten” the Army so it could 
deploy more rapidly.  Ironically, this effort served to reinforce traditional considerations, 
as previously unarmored units were provided with “medium-weight” armored vehicles, 
thereby actually making the Army heavier overall.114 
 The idea of short decisive conflict remains in Army modernization plans today.   
The design requirements for the Future Combat System (FCS) are based on goals that 
ignore what might happen beyond the first month of a potential future war.   For example, 
one of the goals of the FCS is to deploy a brigade in 96 hours and four brigades in 30 
days.  After this point, there is less consideration for what might occur, or what type of 
forces or doctrine is necessary.  During the Cold War, this point in time corresponded to 
the initiation of nuclear war.  Current doctrine still reflects this abrupt transition into the 
unknown, as one of the last chapters in The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills 
states:  
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An attack occurring without warning is immediately noticeable. The first 
indication will be very intense light. Heat and initial radiation come with 
the light, and the blast follows within seconds.  Nuclear attack indicators 
are unmistakable. The bright flash, enormous explosion, high winds, and 
mushroom shaped cloud clearly indicate a nuclear attack.  An enemy 
attack would normally come without warning.  Initial actions must, 
therefore, be automatic and instinctive. The best hasty protection against a 
nuclear attack is to take cover behind a hill or in a fighting position, 
culvert, or ditch.  Time available to take protective action will be 
minimal…You can curl up on one side, but the best position is on the back 
with knees drawn up to the chest… Remain calm, check for injury, check 
weapons and equipment for damage, and prepare to continue the 
mission.115 
 
This advice has not evolved much from the chapters placed towards the end of similar 
Army manuals written in the 1950’s.  The difference today, however, is that the latest 
soldier skills manual has added a chapter on IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), at the 
end of the manual, shortly after instructions on how to survive a nuclear attack.116  The 
areas that the Army does not believe it can address, such as stability operations, guerilla 
tactics, or nuclear war, are typically reserved for the final chapters of its manuals.   
The influence of older ideas is evident in the U.S. Army’s Future Combat System, 
as the theoretical underpinnings of its birth evolved from the doctrinal interaction of two 
Cold War armies (Soviet and American) desperately attempting to rescue conventional 
operations from the menacing nuclear cloud that loomed overhead.117  The Soviets 
believed that precision conventional weapons would eventually render nuclear weapons 
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and decided to adopt it.118  Today, the idea of precision is marketed for “irregular 
challenges.”  The origin of the idea is suggestive of an institutional conservatism that is 
likely to hinder transformation.  The fact that type of challenge is deemed “irregular” 
illustrates the idea that the U.S. Army has a cultural preference for whatever it deems as 
“regular,” and that traditional form of warfare requires significant investment in a brigade 
structure centered around tanks, supported by infantry and artillery.   
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III. “BREAKING STARCH”: THE RESILIENCE OF TRADITION 
The United States Army has undergone three major uniform changes since the 
end of World War II.  An Army Chief of Staff initiated each uniform change during a 
period of reform in doctrine, organization, and equipment acquisition.  These uniform 
changes consist of the all-green uniform in 1954, the Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) in 
1981, and the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) in 2004.  The all-green uniform heralded 
the Pentomic Era, where the Army attempted to utilize nuclear weapons throughout its 
doctrine and organization.  The BDU heralded AirLand Battle doctrine and the 
acquisition of the “Big Five” weapon systems.  The black beret and ACU are the first 
expressions of current Army transformation and its associated Future Combat System 
(FCS).  This chapter frames the new ACU in a historical context in order to assess the 
impact of military traditions during a period of Army reform, and to highlight the 
connections between the design of the new uniform and the design of the FCS.        
In his autobiography, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell 
expressed frustration over the practice of “breaking starch,” whereby uniform pants were 
starched so heavily that the legs had to be broken open with a “broom handle” in order to 
wear the pants.119  Powell was disturbed by the fact that soldiers were spending too much 
time and money ironing and starching their uniforms for “readiness” inspections rather 
than training for actual combat readiness.120  He first used the term “breaking starch” 
while serving as a Lieutenant in Korea in 1961.   Powell believed that starching was an 
example of a “foolish tradition.”121  While writing about experiences in positions of 
greater responsibility, Powell continued to use the phrase “breaking starch” in a 
metaphorical manner when frustrated by senseless bureaucratic practices.     
The Army’s focus on uniform appearance originated from 17th Century Europe, 
during a time when the “readiness” of an army was evident as part of its appearance.  
                                                 




During this time, uniform appearance was an expression of the moral unity of combatants 
as well as their national identity.   Uniform appearance was significant because according 
to Paul Fussell, “soldiers needed to be seen in all their threatening glory to demoralize 
their enemy a short distance away.”122  Today, the connection between massed uniform 
appearance and potential in warfare is irrelevant, as it is possible for armies to fight 
effectively without standing in close formation wearing colorful uniforms. Uniform 
changes, however, continue to be an integral element of current Army transformation.  
The Army plans on equipping fifteen modular brigades with the Future Combat System 
by 2030, in an effort to modernize equipment and undergo “transformation.”  Despite this 
grandiose vision, so far, the black beret and ACU is the only new equipment available to 
soldiers.   
Military attire and acquisitions both reveal certain underlying conservative 
characteristics within the United States Army as an institution that is struggling to find a 
way to simultaneously deal with two significant aspects of warfare: the advent of modern 
indirect fire weapon systems, and the challenge posed by guerilla tactics.  The foreword 
of the Army's latest Counterinsurgency manual points out the long span in time since the 
last publication of a manual devoted to this type of warfare:  
It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted 
exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has 
been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that 
provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such 
guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be 
informed by contemporary experiences.123 
Having a new manual does not necessarily mean that the Army will fully take on this 
type of mission.  The impact of the publication must be analyzed in the context of other 
manuals released during the same period.  The frequency that various manuals are 
updated reveals the true focus of the institution.  For example, the latest version Army's 
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publication, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, was released during 
the same year as the Counterinsurgency manual, but it is updated more frequently.124   
The Army Times frequently features front-page headlines on recent changes 
regarding uniforms and the appropriate wear of various badges, as well as numerous 
posts from readers that are concerned with some aspect of this subject.  Long before the 
French Army marched into battle at the outset of World War I wearing fashionable red 
pants, military institutions have been obsessed with their appearance, sometimes more so 
than with the actual conduct of war.  Even Homer devoted 140 lines in the Iliad to 
describe the armor that Hephaistos forged for Achilles.125  The description of the armor 
served to illustrate certain social beliefs about war rather than the actual functionality of 
the armor in combat.126  Likewise, what soldiers wear into battle reveals certain 
institutional beliefs in the U.S. Army today.   
The acquisitions process for military equipment has grown far more complex than 
during the time of Homer, but it is nonetheless still an area that is interconnected with 
appearance and morality.  The awards and badges worn today represent an 
acknowledgement of the moral burdens shared and endured by those who fight, while the 
design of equipment represents a different type of burden.  In Homer’s time, the 
equipment and uniform were one in the same, but today the separation is apparent by 
what is worn in garrison and combat.  The machinery of war has grown far beyond what 
is worn or carried by troops.  The design of equipment used in combat, however, is still 
an extension of the moral burden of combat to those removed from physical danger.  This 
moral connection has inspired much controversy, and is even linked to the post-traumatic 
stress disorder of some Vietnam veterans who believe that the nation sent them to war 
with inadequate equipment.127     
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A. MILITARY REFORM AND NEW UNIFORMS 
The most significant change in modern military uniforms is the advent of 
camouflage during World War I.  Soldiers began to wear camouflage during this war, and 
it was used to conceal artillery pieces from aerial observation.  The advent of modern 
direct and indirect fire systems caused militaries to adopt camouflage in an attempt to 
conceal troops and critical equipment from being targeted by the devastating effects of 
firepower.128  Despite the enormous incentive to remain invisible to the enemy, however, 
militaries still find themselves getting caught up in the traditional details of how to wear 
numerous colorful and shiny items.   
Napoleon observed that "a soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored 
ribbon."129  He instinctively understood how to appeal to the frailty (or power, depending 
on how you view it) of the human ego, having quite a large ego himself.130  The display 
and allure of colorful items resembles more so the manner in which male peacocks use 
their colorful feathers to attract mates rather than anything of tactical significance in 
modern warfare.  It is no coincidence that the motivations of war and mating, which in 
turn relate to destruction and creation, have similar dynamics.131  The pursuit of a fast 
climax with minimal effort in either endeavor is likely to produce an unsatisfactory 
outcome.  Clausewitz observed, “War does not consist of a single short blow,” as a 
response to such ideas prevalent among militaries of his time, as expressed by Jomini.  
Despite this, the Jominian idea that a rapid climactic battle at some decisive point can 
determine the outcome of a war remains more influential for the US Army, even as it is 
engaged in a “Long War.”132  In fact, the George W. Bush administration’s decision to 
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refer to the “War on Terror” as the “Long War” was a calculated attempt to alter a 
military culture conditioned by the idea of a short decisive war.133 
Ninety-three years ago, French infantrymen marched off to war wearing red pants 
and believing that the psychological shock effect of the color red, combined with the 
"sense of oneness" that it gave units, would lead to a quick victory.134  At the time, the 
French Army believed that "camouflaged material would actually sabotage national 
security."135 The red pants, however, only served to conceal the blood that was shed in 
part because an institution clung to its belief that battles were won by an offensive spirit, 
despite the advent of machine guns and long range predicted artillery fire.  For the U.S. 
Army today, the old French idea that red pants might “shock and awe” an opponent has 
been substituted with similar beliefs about the digitally networked application of 
precision firepower, as evident with the current transformation effort.  Red pants were a 
manifestation of beliefs about offensive spirit, and the color persists in military uniforms 
today.   
Soldiers in the 1st Infantry Division of the U.S. Army proudly display the "Big 
Red One" patch in actual red, as opposed to the subdued black colored patches that most 
units wear.136  The unused subdued color patches overflow the stocks of military clothing 
stores in Wurzburg, Germany and Fort Riley, Kansas, and are only occasionally 
purchased by the new private or lieutenant who knows nothing yet of the traditions of 
war, arriving to their units wearing a patch that is not red, rationally assuming that such a 
color is no longer worn in combat.  The "sense of oneness" that officers believed red 
pants gave the French Army is no different than the sense of oneness that United States 
Army officers hope to instill by wearing the "Big Red One" patch on their shoulder, as 
evident in the below photograph of General John Batiste in Iraq, who was the commander 
of the 1st Infantry Division at the time.   
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Interestingly, the officer in the newly formed Iraqi Army (on the left) is also wearing red, 
on his uniform epaulettes, and a red beret, which was originates as a form of military 
headgear first worn by French mountain troops in the 1880s.137  While the color red may 
be representative of revolutionary zeal in the political sphere, it is representative of 
institutional conservatism in the military sphere.  Red is worn in proud defiance of 
institutional attempts to conceal personnel with camouflage.   
The first outward sign of change in a military institution is evident with the 
introduction of new apparel.  Whether or not the U.S. Army is successful in shifting the 
bulk of its capabilities from "traditional" to "irregular" forms of conflict as per the latest 
guidance from the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review, the one 
certainty is that the institution will find some manner of addressing this shift with new 
military attire.  The introduction of the black beret for the entire Army in 2001 was meant 
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to emphasize a new expeditionary focus for the institution, despite the fact that it is 
unlikely (and unnecessary) for any rapid deployment unit to wear its berets in combat.138  
The story of how the Army was able to acquire enough berets for every soldier by June 
14, 2001 reveals the complexity of the acquisitions process.139  The acquisition of the 
beret inspired a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and numerous 
Congressional testimonies, since many berets were manufactured in China, and 75th 
Ranger Regiment had to pick a new color beret to wear.140  
The introduction of the black beret by General Erik Shinseki in 2001 was 
“strikingly similar” in spirit to the introduction of the green uniform by General Maxwell 
Taylor in 1954.141  The introduction of the green uniform served as the first expression of 
reform for the Army after the Korean War.  The new uniform heralded an era where the 
Army relied heavily on nuclear weapons, developing doctrine that called for the 
distribution of “tactical” nuclear weapons with a two-kilometer range down to the team 
level.142  As seen from the perspective of budgetary politics, the new uniform and 
reliance on nuclear weapons was an attempt to mimic the techniques of the Air Force, 
which had successfully secured a larger share of the defense budget.143     
In an article in a professional journal in 1955, an Army officer jokingly suggested 
that the Army should be absorbed into the Air Force to save money, reduce rivalry, and 
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slides) the week prior to the event, so they fit with a ‘regulation’ appearance on the special day. 
140 The Department of Defense allowed the Defense Logistics Agency to purchase berets from China 
in order to speed the fielding process, in violation of the Berry Amendment.  See: Valerie Grasso.  “The 
Berry Amendment: Requiring Defense Procurement to Come from Domestic Sources.” (April 2005) 
Congressional Research Service, At: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31236.pdf,   2.  
141 Arthur Connor. “The Army and Transformation, 1945-1991, Implications for Today.” (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2002),   22. 
142 The Davy Crocket fired a nuclear warhead at this range, and could be distributed down to the team 
level.  See: Andrew Bacevich. The Pentomic Era. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 
1986), cover of book. 
143 Bacevich, The Pentomic Era.,   17; The Air Force budget grew to become twice and large as the 
Army budget. 
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boost morale by putting soldiers “in a snazzy blue uniform.”144  The motivation for 
having new uniforms during this period was partially due to dissatisfaction with the color 
of the existing uniform.  An official Army study stated, “Because the color was a 
camouflage shade, not normally worn in men's clothing, the uniform was almost 
instinctively rejected.”145  The study also stated “the olive-drab color lacked consumer 
acceptability and that the Army should find a more attractive color if it wished to obtain a 
satisfactory uniform upon which a tradition could be built.”146  To determine the 
appropriate color of the uniform, wives, veterans, and active duty soldiers were surveyed 
on whether they preferred various shades of colors such as gray, blue, green, taupe, or 
even pink.147  This effort was mostly an attempt to “distinguish” and compete with the 
colors used by the Air Force rather than to develop a functional uniform for combat.148  
The Army’s uniform change in 1954 was illustrative of a budget competition with the Air 
Force that echoes today with the Future Combat System.   
After Operation Desert Storm in 1991, proponents of air power argued that the 
Army faced such minimal resistance during the war because the bombing campaign 
already destroyed the Iraqi Army.149  In 1999, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo 
demonstrated the Air Force’s new precision weapons without the presence of significant 
NATO ground forces.  Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a peace settlement after 78 days of 
bombing; thus appearing that air power alone had achieved victory. 150  After the Kosovo 
conflict, the Army Chief of Staff would once again make uniform changes and adopt the 
 
 
                                                 
144 Bacevich,   21. 
145 Stephen Kennedy and Alice Park.  “The Army Green Uniform.” (Natick, MA: U.S Army Clothing 
and Organic Materials Laboratory, 1968),   3. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid.,   1. 
148 Ibid,   4.  The Army intended to develop a new uniform that was not blue (like the Air Force), but 
equally as appealing.   
149 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win. (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 1996),   212. 
150 Anthony Hinen. “War Can Be Won With Air Power Alone!” Air and Space Power Journal. (16 
May 2002),   1 (see title). 
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form of firepower gaining prominence in the Air Force, inspired by similar budgetary 
dynamics and fears of institutional irrelevance that were prevalent in the Army during the 
1950s.   
B. STARCHING CAMOUFLAGE: THE RESTORATION OF TRADITION 
DURING REFORM 
The move from the all-green uniform to the camouflage Battle Dress Uniform 
(BDU) in 1981 heralded the introduction of highly acclaimed Air Land Battle doctrine 
one year later.151  The introduction of the BDU was an attempt to bleed out the manner in 
which traditional military culture continued to infect the Army.  The label on the uniform 
plainly stated, “Do not starch.”152  Experiments and studies determined that the heavy 
starch soldiers applied to their uniforms appeared as a white glow when viewed through 
night vision devices, even after numerous washings.153  The special dyes in the BDU 
were used to limit the visibility of the material in the infrared (IR) spectrum (the T-72 
Soviet tank used an IR sight), and these were rendered ineffective by starch.154  Starched 
uniforms also enhanced the potential for detection using thermal imaging systems (such 
as the one in the T-80 Soviet tank) due to increased heat retention.155  Additionally, the 
practice of starching wasted troops’ free time and meager salary.   
The new uniform coincided with growing concern that the Soviet Army would 
use the cover of darkness commence an attack through the Fulda Gap in a thrust toward 
the English Channel.  At the time, the Soviet Union led the way in the development of 
night vision equipment and had a history of initiating major operations at night, combined 
                                                 
151 It also emerged during the same year as the comedy Stripes, starring Bill Murray, where soldiers 
wore the all green uniform.  The film depicted the Army as an unsuccessful institution that recruited those 
who were unsuccessful in civilian society.  The new uniform was an attempt to change the Army’s image.  
Interestingly, the movie depicted an experimental new weapon system that looked like a recreational 
vehicle, but had capabilities similar to FCS vehicles. 
152 See label on the uniform. 
153 FM 20-3 Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys (30 August 1999) Washington, DC: 




with doctrine that called for night offensives.156  U.S. Army initiatives to “own the night” 
during the 1980s were inspired by these concerns.157  Although most of the initiatives 
were successful, attempts to end the tradition of starching uniforms were largely 
unsuccessful, particularly in the infantry.  Even the Ranger Creed states the importance of 
“neatness of dress,” and many Rangers continued to interpret this as having BDUs with 
the most starch.  In 2003, the Army finally yielded to the influence of its traditional 
culture with a compromise whereby doctrine stated: 
Although some uniform items are made of wash-and-wear materials or are 
treated with a permanent-press finish, soldiers may need to press these 
items to maintain a neat, military appearance. However, before pressing 
uniform items, soldiers should read and comply with care instruction 
labels attached to the items. Soldiers may starch BDUs and the maternity 
work uniform, at their option. Commanders will not require soldiers to 
starch these uniforms, and soldiers will not receive an increase in their 
clothing replacement allowance to compensate for potential premature 
wear that may be caused by starching uniforms.158 
 
The Army entered Baghdad five months before the publication of this statement.  Around 
this time, it became clear to many in the institution that such concerns were irrelevant in 
all modern warfare, whether traditional or irregular. 
C. “BREAKING STARCH”: THE ARMY COMBAT UNIFORM (ACU) 
The ACU was introduced on June 14, 2004, the Army’s Birthday.  Like the all-
green uniform, BDU, and black beret that came before it, the new uniform was intended 
as departure from tradition, and a step forward to the future of warfare.  The new uniform 
was accompanied by a stern directive stating:  “Soldiers will not starch the Army Combat 
                                                 
156 Claude R. Sasso. “Soviet Night Operations in World War II.” Combat Studies Institute. (December 
1982). Fort Leavenworth, KS. At: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Sasso/SASSO.asp.  
Accessed on 25 Feb 08. 
157 Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate. “Early Attempts at Night Vision Technology.” 
United States Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command. At: 
http://www.nvl.army.mil/about/index.php.  Also, the invasion of Iraq was initiated at night. 
158 FM 7-21.13 “Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Soldier.” The Soldier’s Guide. 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 15 October 2003), chapter  3, paragraph  92. 
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Uniform under any circumstances.”159  This directive was worded stronger than the 
instructions associated with the BDU in 1981, and accompanied by an aggressive internal 
information campaign.  Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth Preston issued the 
following statement to all noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the Army: 
If we as NCOs enforce the standards and intent of the regulation, the 
savings gained by not sewing on patches or laundering at dry-cleaners 
should more than make up for the purchase and replacement costs.  I look 
to you to help our Soldiers embrace this Warrior focus, while maintaining 
the clean appearance our Army is renowned for.160  
 
This quotation was on PowerPoint slides in briefings given by NCOs throughout the 
Army.  The intent of the regulation mentioned by SMA Preston was not to starch the 
uniform, and to utilize the new Velcro patches instead of sewing on patches.  His 
challenge to find ways to maintain the renowned “clean appearance” without starch was 
met with much creativity.161  Numerous internet forums with posts written by soldiers 
illustrate ways of stiffening the ACU without starch, such as by putting it under a 
mattress and sleeping on top of it, whereby the Army was literally resting upon tradition 
while facing the future of warfare.162  The fact that some soldiers go to this extreme does 
not imply that they believe it is necessary, lack intelligence, or cling to tradition, but 
rather, as in all else they do (such as risking their lives), it is expected by the institution.  
Soldiers can earn promotion points based on maintaining a certain appearance, so that 
they can one day rise toward the top of the institution and preserve such “foolish 
traditions,” while weeding out those who do not comply.163  For soldiers who spend 
weeks on combat patrols, the psychological effect of seeing uniforms with a “clean 
                                                 
159 Department of the Army G1 Office Memorandum. “Army Combat Uniform.” At: 
http://www.armyg1.army.mil/HR/uniform/docs/Army%20Combat%20Uniform%20(ACU)%20Ensemble.p
df.  Accessed on 15 Feb 08. 
160 Kenneth Preston. “Army Combat Uniform Briefing.” Slide 4. 
161 This may have been an unintentional challenge.  His use of the word “clean” may have been 
interpreted in traditional terms to mean “stiff.” 
162 “How to Really Square Away Your ACUs?”At: 
http://forums.military.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/56819558/m/4010023251001. Accessed on 10 Dec 07, 
163 When a former Chairman of the JCS refers to something as a “foolish tradition,” and the tradition 
continues, this illustrates the power of institutional culture and conservatism in the military.  
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appearance” worn by others who remain inside Forward Operating Bases will likely be 
associated with the post-traumatic stress disorder in future generations of soldiers.   
The direction of Army transformation is evident with the new Army Combat 
Uniform.  The digitized camouflage pattern alludes to the role that the digitization of 
various weapon systems might play in the future conduct of war.  In contrast to having a 
different camouflage pattern for different environments, the new digitized pattern is 
meant for all environments.  This is reflective of the Army’s belief that its new weapon 
systems are also suitable for all combat environments, and can attain “full-spectrum 
dominance.”164  By designing a camouflage pattern intended for all environments, the 
Army created a uniform not optimized for specific environments.165  Furthermore, the 
Velcro on the pockets draws an unnecessary amount of attention when one is trying to 
remain hidden while opening a pocket to pull out one of the new digital devices that 
controls the FCS.166  The Marine Corps, often considered a highly adaptable military 
institution, has a different approach to its combat uniforms.  The new Marine Corps 
Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU) uses a hybrid design whereby pockets that can be 
accessed while wearing body armor use old-fashioned buttons which do not make noise, 
while all other pockets that are only accessible without body armor (in a garrison 
environment) use Velcro.  The new Marine uniform does not rely on a single color 
scheme, and instead uses separate woodland and desert patterns for different 
environments.  This exhibits a willingness to use different equipment in different 
environments that is lacking in the Army.      
The pants worn by troops reveal far more about the beliefs of a military institution 
than one might expect.  Pants also reveal the nature of the tasks that troops must perform.  
                                                 
164 “Future Combat Systems Phase 1.” At: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs-1.htm.   Accessed on 10 Dec 07. 
 165 The new ACU pattern is optimal only in an urban environment.   This may be an accurate 
prediction on where troops are most likely to operate in the future.  The fact that the pattern is not optimal 
in an area of heavy vegetation (Vietnam) reveals an institutional attempt to reject the possibility of fighting 
in such an environment.   
166 In response to this concern, the Army’s Program Executive Office Soldier stated, “It was 
determined that the issue of noise associated with the hook and pile fastener in a tactical environment could 
be overcome with familiarity and use during training (noise and light discipline) much like what Soldiers 
currently do when employing other weapons and individual equipment items in a tactical environment.” At: 
http://peosoldier.army.mil/faqs.asp#Q64.  Accessed on 10 Dec 07. 
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A recent acquisition controversy revealed that the new ACU pants have poor stitching in 
the “crotch” area and frequently rip open.167  While this may be due to a correctable 
manufacturing problem, it is also reflective of the fact that troops in a modern 
mechanized army are actually spending more time on their feet rather than in their 
vehicles.  This is because it is difficult to build democracies and achieve the political ends 
of irregular warfare while sitting inside of armored vehicles and fortified compounds.168   
Despite the shortcomings of the new ACU, it may have eliminated the use of 
starch.  Most Army officers are unaware of the fact that this measure was originally 
inspired when contemplating how to deal with the Soviet Army, rather than how to 
conduct irregular warfare.169  “Owning the night” may have offered an advantage when 
defending the Fulda Gap from a major Soviet offensive initiated at night, but it offers 
little improvement in capability when fighting against an opponent that prefers to sleep at 
night.  Insurgents in heavily populated urban areas wisely choose not to operate during 
the still of night, where curfews are strictly enforced, and any activity is quickly spotted 
by patrols and observation posts using the latest night-vision technologies.   Instead, the 
enemy remains elusive by blending into daytime rush hour traffic and busy marketplaces.  
This form of camouflage drastically outperforms the new ACU, and poses a tactical 
problem characteristic of irregular warfare.  In this case, the difference in what is worn by 
opposing forces highlights the central difference between irregular and traditional 
warfare.  Modern military uniforms simultaneously serve two contradictory purposes: the 
purpose of identification, which originated in the 17th Century; and the purpose of 
concealment, which originated in the 20th Century.  In the 21st Century, identification 
serves a political purpose while concealment serves a tactical purpose.  Irregular warfare 
occurs when at least one party in a violent struggle chooses to serve both purposes 
                                                 
167 Tom Vanden Brook. “Army Fixing Uniforms Prone to Rips: Soldiers Report Problem with Crotch 
Durability.” USA Today. (27 November 2007),   1. 
168 This is not necessarily meant to imply that getting out of the vehicles and compounds would foster 
much better results.  Armor is still necessary, but not for the traditional doctrinal purpose of “shock effect” 
or “closing with and destroying the enemy.”  Instead it may be necessary to support dismounted infantry in 
urban areas, though it was not designed for this environment. 
169 Likewise, critics of FCS argue that the entire program is driven by obsolete Cold War 
requirements. 
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without a uniform.  Failure in the conduct of irregular warfare is certain for the side that 
does not understand this possibility, or considers it a “lousy” way of conducting war.     
The minor success in equipment procurement and doctrine evident with the new 
ACU is overshadowed by the fact that a new uniform and aggressive internal information 
campaign was necessary to subvert the Army’s traditional focus on its appearance.  This 
pattern continues with the new boot associated with the ACU.  The tan desert boot worn 
with the new ACU was purposely chosen because its rough leather cannot be shined.  As 
a result, the Sarah Lee Corporation, owner of Kiwi shoe polish, decided to market shoe 
inserts and fresheners instead of polish in order to maintain profits.170  Fortunately, the 
Army has discovered that shoe polish does not win wars.  However, it must realistically 
assess its assumptions involving larger decisions, such as the $200 billion Future Combat 
System.  The new modular boot design is based on the same idea as the new modular 
FCS brigade design, as both are intended to operate in any environment.  However, 
designing a lightweight boot that is ideal from -20 degrees to 130 degrees stretches the 
limits of physics.171  Similarly, the notion that one type of brigade structure can be ideal 
for both traditional and irregular warfare also stretches the limits of physics.  The 
characteristics of the new ACU and Modular Boot System reverberate throughout the 
Army’s modernization program, revealing the institution’s approach to “full-spectrum 








                                                 
170 Julie Jargon. “Kiwi Goes Beyond Shine in Effort to Step up Sales.” The Wall Street Journal. (20 
December 2007),   1; This implication is minor for a company that also makes cakes, but for companies 
that manufacture armored vehicles, the implications of Army modernization are much larger.     
171 Matthew Cox. “A Boot for all Seasons.” Army Times. (10 December 2007),   8. 
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IV. FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM 
This chapter assesses the two major design characteristics of the Future Combat 
System (FCS), air-mechanization and networked sensors.172  Manned ground vehicles 
(MGVs) in the FCS will weigh significantly less than current vehicles such as the 70-ton 
Abrams tank and 35-ton Bradley IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle).  The reduction in 
weight is intended to accommodate rapid deployment with aircraft.  This concept is 
known as air-mechanization (Air-Mech).  Because the MGVs will have less physical 
armor than current vehicles, they will rely on a network of long-range sensors in order to 
maneuver outside of the range of enemy weapon systems, allowing the FCS to “see first 
and shoot first.”    
The most criticized aspect of the FCS is the reduction of physical armor on eight 
new manned vehicles.  These vehicles will rely on active protection systems rather than 
physical armor.  Active protection systems will detect and intercept incoming kinetic 
energy projectiles fired from enemy tanks.173  These proposed vehicles and units would 
arguably be more effective than current forces in future conflict because they can deploy 
faster (due to less weight), and are capable of long-range precision firepower as a result 
of advances in information technology.  Nevertheless, these advantages, while real, also 
reflect a characteristic, long-standing emphasis upon scenarios involving only the initial 
outbreak of war, the role of mechanization, and the range of weapon systems.  This may 
be indicative of a reluctance to let go of traditional preoccupations that emerged during 
the Cold War in light of new and emerging threats.   
The air-mechanization capacity of the FCS can be measured in terms of vehicle 
tonnage, deployment distance, and the number of sorties required for transport.  These 
technical considerations correspond to political objectives that may call for rapid 
                                                 
172 The Army-wide adoption of the black beret alludes to the idea of air-mechanization, while the 
digitized ACU pattern illustrates the pursuit of digitization, or networked sensors. 
173 Robin Hughes. “Israel Armor Protection System ‘Revolutionary’.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. (16 
March 2005); This is similar to the Israeli Trophy Active Protection System which was developed for the 
Merkava tank and armored personnel carriers.  The U.S. Army briefly considered purchasing this system 
for the FCS, but instead decided to develop a more advanced system.  Regardless, such systems hinder the 
ability for foot soldiers to operate near a vehicle, as they may be inadvertently killed when the system 
engages an incoming round.     
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deployment of the U.S. Army.  Air-mechanization may be required in situations 
involving imminent threat, lack of allied support for a deployment, or geographic 
constraints (such as lack of seaports).  The only historical cases where the Air-Mech 
concept was used to conduct an attack are: Operation Jonathan, conducted by Israel in 
Uganda (1976), and Operation Airborne Dragon, conducted by the United States in 
northern Iraq (2003).174  These two cases reveal the possibilities and limitations of the 
air-mechanization concept in a hostile environment.  The time necessary for deployment 
of certain sized-forces to various locations is based on technical factors that can be 
calculated with near-absolute certainty.175  The strategic dynamics of rapid deployment 
depends on the nature of the political objective, and can be inferred from the historical 
cases. 
The System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE) is intended 
to link the sensors of the FCS via a secure wireless network connecting mechanized 
forces while simultaneously on the move.176  This will allow the FCS to engage enemy 
forces beyond the range of physical or visual (human eye) contact.  The potential of 
networked sensors is a matter of bandwidth (network throughput) and software 
development for the human interface between sensor data and weapon systems.177  
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo best illustrates the potential and limitations of 
networked sensors in conventional operations.  Ironically, the Army’s ground-based 
                                                 
174 The Army’s deployment of Task Force Hawk during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was also a 
case of air-mechanization, but most of the force was never used.  This deployment utilized aircraft and 
included a company of tanks, but the tanks were not intended for an offensive role.  The deployment of 
attack helicopters, though intended for an offensive role, were never used, as they were vulnerable to 
attack. 
175 Only the time requirement can be calculated with certainty.  This does not imply successful 
deployment is guaranteed by the calculations, as this is a factor of suppression or destruction of potential 
enemy air defenses and fighter intercept aircraft, as it is always possible to shoot down cargo aircraft before 
they land.   The time requirement can be calculated with near-certainty, but whether or not the requirement 
can be achieved is another matter. 
176 Paul Schoen.  (SOSCOE Director) “System of Systems Common Operating Environment.”  
Briefing Slides.  FCS Lead Systems Integrator, Boeing (15 September 2006), At: 
http://www.afei.org/brochure/6a04/documents/PaulSchoen_PublicReleaseshort.pdf.  The purpose of the 
SOSCOE is to link vehicle platforms in a net-centric configuration. Slide No. 4. 
177 FCS network software is also intended to reduce bandwidth by allowing sensors to process 
information prior to transmission based on certain predetermined adjustable criteria.  Software will filter 
the transmission of high-bandwidth data, such as video feeds from unmanned systems, to prevent the 
network from being flooded with useless information. 
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sensors inadvertently played a decisive role in the conflict.  Task Force Hawk deployed 
to Kosovo in 1999, consisting of Apache attack helicopters, based on the assumption that 
helicopters could provide the decisive blow against Serbian ground forces that the U.S. 
Air Force could not deliver.  This did not occur.  Instead, radar systems assigned to 
artillery units supporting the Apaches inadvertently provided critical targeting data to the 
Air Force.178  The capabilities of the Army’s Firefinder series counterbattery radar 
systems, evident in combat scenarios, provide an example of what can be accomplished 
by a networked system of sensors.  The belated adaptation of these systems for current 
use in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that Army planners were unaware of the role played 
by these sensors the past.  Although counterbattery radars are only one type of sensor, 
their real-time linkage of sensors-to-shooters via a network closely resembles capabilities 
envisioned by the FCS and SOSCOE, while having a historical basis for analysis.  
Ultimately, warfare is not simply a matter finding and destroying targets.  The FCS 
network’s capacity for collection, management, and sharing of data will facilitate 
logistical functions, and may assist in compiling information necessary to conduct police 
functions, such as control of populations.    
A. AIR MECHANIZATION (AIR-MECH) CONCEPT 
The Future Combat System’s eight manned vehicles are based on a common 
chassis to decrease logistical requirements and replace aging vehicles such as the 
Abrams, Bradley, and Paladin.  The following table shows the original vehicle design 
requirements developed in 1999:  
                                                 
178 Data that could not be obtained with the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS).   
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Table 1: Original FCS Requirements (From Defense Horizons) 
 
Today, most of the original design goals remain the same, with the exception of 
the 18-ton minimum weight requirement.  The original requirement was based on the 
ability to transport one vehicle on a C-130 Hercules, since this aircraft can land on 
unimproved dirt or grass surfaces.  In 2004, Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey stated 
that an “evolution in thinking” caused the Army to set a “real requirement,” of less than 
24 tons, with three vehicles fitting on a C-17 Globemaster.179  In 2007, the minimum 
weight requirement increased to 27 tons, with three vehicles fitting on a C-17, and 
disassembled components trailing behind on two C-130s.180  Additionally, the Army 
                                                 
179 Greg Grant. “U.S. Army Drops C-130 Requirement for FCS.” Defense News. (September 2005). 
At: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1129661&C=america. Accessed on 15 Feb 08. 
180 Kris Osborne. “Iraq War Drove Weight of FCS Vehicles.” Defense News. (April 2007).  
Available: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2672608.  Accessed on 15 Feb 08. 
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suggested it may develop a quad tilt rotor transport aircraft.181  This specific proposal is a 
direct result of the 1948 Key West Agreement, which served as a bureaucratic peace 
treaty regarding the proper roles of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  Part of this 
agreement allows the Army to develop helicopters, but sets a 5,000-pound upper weight 
limit on the development of fixed wing aircraft.182  Tilt rotor aircraft designs purposely 
blur the distinction between what constitutes a helicopter and fixed wing aircraft.  The tilt 
rotor design has more to do with inter-service politics than with aeronautical engineering, 
as the Army believes the Air Force should develop more cargo aircraft.183     
FCS vehicle specifications are based on former Army Chief of Staff Erik 
Shinseki’s original goal of deploying one combat brigade, anywhere in the world, in less 
than 96 hours, using airlift rather than sealift.  Additionally, his “transformation” goals 
call for the deployment of a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.  If 
realized, Shinseki’s vision would set the Army on a peacetime alert posture necessary to 
conduct an operation on the scale of Normandy within 30 days notice, but from the air, 
with completely mechanized divisions.184  Current estimates reveal, however, that it 
would take longer than 96 hours to deploy one brigade of the FCS.  Even if it were 
possible to deploy a brigade in 96 hours, this capability does not adequately address 
"irregular warfare," and is driven more by Jomini's idea of quickly massing at some 
decisive point.  The Army’s focus on rapid deployment is based on the hope that winning 
a “decisive battle” during the initial outbreak of war can avert the need for a long-term 
mobilization of resources.  Finally, it is unlikely that airlift can deliver the daily fuel 
requirement for such a force, or that it will be available in the theater of deployment.   
Numerous studies reveal that airlift offers only marginal improvements in 
deployment time as compared to sealift or use of prepositioned stocks.  One brigade of 
                                                 
181 John Gordon, David Johnson, and Peter Wilson. “Air-Mechanization: An Expensive and Fragile 
Concept.” Military Review. (January-February 2007),   65. 
182 Morton Halperin and Dave Halperin.  “The Key West Key.” Foreign Policy. No. 53. (Winter 
1983-1984),   117. 
183 It is unlikely that the Army will actually attempt to build such an aircraft.  Suggesting the 
possibility, however, serves as a bureaucratic statement directed at the Air Force.  This type of aircraft will 
most likely be shot down if attempting to fly through even primitive air defenses. 
184 The U.S. portion of the initial invading force at Normandy consisted of five light infantry 
divisions.   
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FCS equipment is projected to weigh 18,700 tons, as compared to the current 25,000 ton 
modular heavy brigade. 185  Based on the Air Mobility Planning Factors pamphlet issued 
by the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command, it would take 20 days to deploy an FCS 
equipped brigade and 23 days to deploy a modular (or pre-modular) heavy brigade using 
airlift from Savannah, GA to Djibouti, East Africa.186  Using sealift, it would take 25 
days for either type of brigade.  In 2002, RAND calculated deployment times for the 
12,840 ton Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), based on optimistic sortie rates, and 
the assumption of having advanced airfield facilities.  The first chart below illustrates 
RAND’s estimates on deployment of Stryker brigades with airlift:  
 
 
Figure 3: Deployment of SBCT Using Airlift.187 
                                                 
185 Frances Lussier, The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2006),   36.  
186 The variables used to calculate deployment time are: tonnage, dimensions, number of aircraft, 
hours each aircraft will fly, time needed to fly to and from destination.  Using the Air Force's planned fleet 
of 180 C-17 aircraft, given the distance from Savannah, GA to Djibouti, East Africa, assuming that airfields 
will be used for 24 hours per day, and that it would take 3.5 hours to unload equipment.  Based on: 
Department of the Air Force, Air Mobility Command, Air Mobility Planning Factors. Pamphlet 10-1403 
(18 December 2003).  RAND estimates are more optimistic, as they are based on a higher sortie rate, yet 
still short of the goal.   
187 From Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones. “The Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options.” (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2002),   23. 
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This second chart illustrates calculations based on sealift: 
 
Figure 4: Deployment of SBCT Using Sealift188 
 
In some cases, deployment of one brigade with airlift takes longer than sealift.  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that only one brigade will be deployed in a contingency.   
SBCT equipment weighs less than the projected weight of a FCS brigade.  At best, FCS 
brigades can deploy with airlift an average of three to five days faster than current forces 
utilizing sealift, at a projected cost of $200 billion, for an operational status by 2025.189 A 
gain of three to five days in reaction time is hardly “transformational.”  Also, sealift can 
accommodate a much higher tonnage in the same time period, which means that more 
units can deploy in the same time frame, with the logistics necessary for their support.190   
Fuel is the most constraining logistical factor for mechanized forces, and the 
volume necessary to conduct operations has increased in recent history.  The fuel 
efficiency requirements for FCS vehicles are deceiving.  The 33-50% reduction in fuel 
consumption is based on attaining rates that are better than only the Abrams tank, rather 
                                                 
188 Vick et al.,. “The Stryker Brigade Combat Team,”   23. 
189 United States Government Accountability Office. (GAO-07-380). “Role of Lead Systems 
Integrator on Future Combat Systems Program Poses Oversight Challenges.” (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 
2007),   1. This amount can purchase 15 brigades worth of equipment.  
190 Lussier, The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives,  36. 
 54
than a rate better than the average of all Army vehicles.191  The Army promotes hybrid 
FCS vehicle designs as if meant to attain greater fuel efficiency.  In reality, the purpose of 
the hybrid design is to meet power generation requirements for numerous electronic 
components, rather than to increase fuel efficiency.  For example, the 1,500 horsepower 
turbine on the Abrams tank is complimented in later designs by an auxiliary generator 
mounted on the back of the turret to provide power for turret systems and new electronics 
without having to run the turbine.  The hybrid FCS vehicle design will eliminate the need 
for auxiliary power units, but will require significant quantities of fuel, as the electronic 
subsystems can only function for less than one hour in “silent watch” mode using battery 
power, without running engines.192    
Airlift scenarios used by planners overlook logistical requirements necessary to 
sustain the FCS once deployed.  As a reference point, the peak fuel consumption rate for 
Allied ground forces in Europe during World War II, occurring between the breakout 
from Normandy and Victory in Europe, was around one million gallons per day.  This 
was delivered using a combination of supply trucks, fuel depots and the construction of 
pipelines-under-the-oceans (PLUTO).193  General George Patton’s 3rd Army (400,000 
men) burned 380,000 gallons per day at peak consumption during pursuit and 
exploitation operations.194  During the lowest point (August 31 to September 8, 1944) in 
fuel distribution, at 31,000 gallons per day, Patton told Eisenhower, “My men can eat 
their belts, but my tanks gotta have gas!”195  In contrast, during the invasion of Iraq, 
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ground forces smaller than that of Patton required 1.5 million gallons of fuel per day.196  
Fuel consumption for ground forces in Iraq has since increased to a steady rate of 1.7 
million gallons per day.197  Most Army vehicles burn JP-8, weighing six pounds per 
gallon.  This equates to 5,100 tons of fuel per day consumed by ground forces during 
combat operations in Iraq.198  The weight of fuel constitutes 70% of the tonnage of 
logistical support for mechanized forces.199  If the FCS burns 50% less fuel than current 
forces, then eight days of fuel supply still weighs more than the total tonnage for one FCS 
brigade worth of equipment.  This is not factored into the Army’s overly optimistic 
deployment calculations.  It is unlikely that aircraft can transport FCS brigades while 
simultaneously transporting this volume of fuel using storage bladders, in the event fuel 
cannot be seized in a hostile area.200  The more prudent manner of calculating 
deployment times is to plan backwards by first considering the logistical requirements, as 
there is no point in deploying vehicles without fuel. 
1. Historical Cases of Air-Mech 
Armored vehicles have been deployed by aircraft to a hostile environment on two 
occasions.  The characteristics and outcome of these two cases are useful in determining 
the potential and shortcomings of FCS units intended to deploy using aircraft.  Just 
because a particular type of operation was successful in the past does not mean that that a 
similar type of operation will be successful in the future.  From a technical and historical 
standpoint, air-mechanization is possible for units smaller than a brigade.  Such a feat 
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illustrates mastery over unique tactical and technical skills, combined with a particular 
sense of urgency to employ force.  The strategic feasibility of the Air Mech concept, 
however, depends upon the nature of the political objective, and whether it can be 
accomplished rapidly.  The following cases illustrate the political and logistical 
complexities of the concept, as these two areas are linked.   
2. Operation Jonathan 
The Air-Mech concept was first used by Israel in 1976 to rescue hostages from a 
state-sponsored terrorist group.  On June 27, 1976, a commercial airline (Air France) 
departing Israel was hijacked by terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP).201  After a temporary stop at Benghazi, Libya, the hijacked plane and 
passengers arrived at an airport in Entebbe, Uganda (East Africa).202  The passengers 
were held by terrorists, with the cooperation of Ugandan soldiers, in an old terminal 
building.  The Israeli passengers on board were taken hostage, while French citizens 
(other than the crewmembers, who refused to leave) were released.203  At this point, it 
became clear Idi Amin, the president of Uganda at the time, was collaborating with the 
terrorists.  On July 4, 1976, Israel used C-130s to deploy motorized forces supported by 
armored vehicles a distance 2,220 miles, to Entebbe, Uganda, in order to rescue the 
hostages.204  The motorized forces consisted of a Mercedes (bearing the Ugandan flag to 
appear as an official vehicle) and two Land Rovers.205  Four APCs (Armored Personnel 
Carriers) and dismounted infantry supported the motorized forces.  According to the 
commander of the C-130 squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Shani, “The plan was 
relatively simple.  It was based on the fact that no one would think we were crazy enough 
to fly there, so it would be a total surprise.”206   
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During the operation, APCs destroyed eight MiGs while they were still on the 
ground, and assisted in securing fuel for the C-130s return flight.207   Ten fuel technicians 
accompanied the mission to facilitate this process.208  Additionally, Israelis brought a 
portable pump in case fuel could not be pumped from the airport’s underground storage 
tanks with Ugandan pumps.209  After about two hours from the time the first C-130 
landed, 106 hostages were rescued.  Ultimately, the refueling effort was cut short forty 
minutes prior to completion, given the need to leave Uganda immediately after the 
hostages were secured.  Kenya granted permission for a refueling stop in Nairobi.  At this 
point the mission was leaked to the media, and Israel dispatched a fighter escort for the 
final leg of the egress, fearing a fighter aircraft interception on the C-130s from either 
Egypt or Saudi Arabia.210   
Overall, the operation was viewed by Israelis as a success, but not without losses.  
Four Israeli soldiers were killed, including the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan 
Netanyahu, who was shot in the chest while leading the operation.  One hostage was not 
rescued.  Seventy-five year old Dora Bloch, was not in the terminal building because she 
was brought to the hospital the day prior to the operation, after choking on food.   Dora 
Bloch was later executed in retaliation for the hostage rescue operation and destruction of 
the MiGs.211 
Prior to Operation Jonathan, the Israeli strategy of refusing to negotiate with 
terrorists was having a devastating effect upon national pride in light of failed hostage 
rescue attempts in 1974 and 1975.212  Operation Jonathan restored Israeli confidence in 
the IDF and its Sayeret Matkal Counterterrorist Unit (known as The Unit).  Israel used 
the Air-Mech concept in 1976, in part, because the nature of the political objective 
(rescuing hostages) involved either immediate success or complete failure.  The objective 
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was accomplished in less than two hours.  If Israeli armored vehicles remained in Uganda 
for a significant period, the Ugandan Army would have overwhelmed them.213  Even 
within this short time span, fuel considerations were a primary concern, as part of their 
mission involved securing a fuel supply.  
Missions involving the Air-Mech concept must have political objectives that can 
be accomplished in a short time.  Rescuing hostages, capturing enemy personnel, 
preempting the use of WMDs, or seizing other critical equipment may fit these 
parameters.  If the FCS is deployed to perform a mission involving occupation of 
territory or “regime change,” it is unlikely this can be accomplished in a short time span.  
The Israeli case suggests that a successful Air-Mech raid calls for extensive cooperation 
between special operations forces and conventional mechanized units.  Furthermore, the 
use of aircraft to move forces on short notice requires immediate diplomatic coordination 
with allies, and the use of fighter aircraft to guard against an attack by neutral countries 
whose airspace may be violated during the operation.    
3. Operation Airborne Dragon 
During the planning process for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey denied 
permission for the 4th Infantry Division to enter Iraq from the north.  The initial invasion 
plan was based on a two-pronged attack.  Turkey’s decision forced planners to develop 
an alternate method of introducing ground forces into northern Iraq.  Proponents of the 
FCS argue that it would have been ideal in this scenario, because the vehicles are 
designed to conduct Air-Mech operations.  Without this option, the Army deployed a 
small armored force to northern Iraq using C-17s.  This force was under the control of 
Special Operations Command, and consisted of the 173rd Airborne Regiment, reinforced 
by Task Force 1-63 Armor. The latter was organized with Abrams tanks, mechanized 
infantry, engineers, scouts, military police, maintenance vehicles, and other logistical 
support.214  This small force deployed on 30 C-17 sorties.  Once deployed, TF 1-63 AR 
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required 10,000 gallons of fuel per day, and a continual stream of repair parts flown from 
its motor pool sustainment stocks in Germany.215  This was the first time Abrams tanks 
were inserted into hostile environment using aircraft.  Special Forces teams secured fuel 
depots in Iraq prior to the arrival of the force.216  Additionally, military planners secured 
a line-haul contract (semi trucks) with a private Turkish company for fuel delivery, while 
diplomats obtained permission from the Turkish government.217  Kurdish factions in Iraq 
assisted in distribution of commercial fuel movements.218  These actions were necessary 
to support a company-sized element of Abrams tanks, a company of Bradleys, and two 
companies of M113 armored personnel carriers.  
The tanks inserted into northern Iraq in 2003 were able to conduct operations 
without significant casualties or damage to equipment, while maintaining a 90% 
operational ready rate.219  According to Army planners, these forces accomplished their 
initial entry mission, and were “nearly impervious to Iraqi weapon systems.”220  Shortly 
after their arrival, “enemy divisions in northern Iraq began to disintegrate.”221  The 
overall success of operations in northern Iraq, however, is questionable, considering 
Turkey recently decided to introduce ground forces in the region, due to concerns with 
regional instability.  It is too early to assess the long-term strategic outcome of military 
operations in northern Iraq.  Operation Airborne Dragon illustrates that a battalion-sized 
mechanized force can be introduced in a hostile environment with aircraft, given 
significant light infantry support, extensive logistical arrangements, destruction of enemy 
air defense, regional allied support (i.e. German basing, Turkish fuel), and the eventual 
arrival of follow on forces supplied from a port.  
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4. Analysis of Air-Mech Concept 
Operation Jonathan and Operation Airborne Dragon prove that a small armored 
force can be inserted into hostile territory using aircraft.  Although both cases were 
successful, this does not mean that the FCS should be based on the Air-Mech concept.  It 
is unwise to base the FCS program’s design constraints exclusively on having this 
capability, considering that supply lines will eventually be established from a port in a 
long-term operation.  The feat has already been accomplished with existing forces, under 
extreme conditions, at the very limit of the concept’s utility.  Depending on the specific 
mission assigned to FCS brigades, air-mechanization may be useful, but it is important to 
understand basic political limitations of the concept.  Restructuring the entire U.S. 
Army’s capabilities based on considerations involving only the first 30 days of a war is 
problematic if engaged in a “Long War.”  The U.S. Army already has an advantage in the 
rapid, decisive use of force to destroy conventional ground forces, as it spent most of the 
Cold War pursuing capabilities in this area.222   
From the perspective of international politics, pursuit of the Air Mech concept is 
based on the belief it provides a capacity for unilateral action with military forces.  In 
both cases examined, however, extensive allied support was required to deploy armored 
forces with aircraft in a hostile environment.  From the perspective of domestic politics, 
having such a capability is based on the fact that generations of politicians in the Midwest 
have preferred for the bulk of the U.S. Army’s mechanized forces to remain in bases 
originally intended for subduing various Indian tribes along the frontier of American 
expansion during the 19th Century.  Today, there is little remaining of these Indian tribes, 
and the American “frontier” is located in a different hemisphere.  Railroad companies are 
eager to secure contracts to move Army equipment almost one thousand miles via 
railroad from bases in the middle of Texas, Kansas, or Colorado to port cities such as 
Beaumont, Texas, located along the Gulf of Mexico.  This logistical task can be 
accomplished with remarkable speed, yet it would not be necessary if it were not for the 
historical influence of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Sioux, and Pottawattamie Indian tribes on 
                                                 
222 Air-Mech is a matter of doing something that has already been done, only marginally better.   
 61
current Army basing.223  The technical issues of the Air-Mech concept are simply a 
minor manifestation of larger political issues beyond the scope of what 27-ton vehicles 
can address.   
The first FCS brigade will originate from the Army Evaluation Task Force 
(AETF), formed in February 2007.224  This brigade is scheduled to be operational in 
2015, and will be located in Fort Bliss, Texas, about 700 miles from the nearest port, 
Corpus Christi, Texas.225  At this location, despite the Army’s visions of Air-Mech, FCS 
equipment will probably one day be loaded onto ships, after first being loaded and 
unloaded onto rail cars, just as the first “interim force” SBCT deployed to Iraq on ships 
from the port of Tacoma, Washington rather than by C-130.226   
B. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS COMMON OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
Most of the focus on the FCS is on the hardware, while the software component is 
overlooked.  The software is significant because it is the more ambitious aspect of the 
FCS program.  FCS software requires developers to write 34 million lines of code.227  
This is five times as many lines as necessary for the Joint Strike Fighter, the largest 
defense undertaking in terms of software to date.228  All components of the FCS will 
depend upon the software for successful operation.  The System-of-Systems Common 
Operating Environment (SOSCOE), according to journalist Alec Klein, “is supposed to 
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be like Windows, the world’s dominant operating system, only better.”229  SOSCOE is 
currently being developed by Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC), through a variety of subcontracts.230  In 2004, SAIC was unable to provide the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with computer systems to replace paper files, after 
three years and $170 million.231  The difficulty in developing software for networking in 
stationary buildings, such as FBI offices, is compounded when developing software that 
can, according to Klein, “conduct a video teleconference in a tank rumbling about 40 
mph in the haze of battle.”232  The purpose of SOSCOE, however, is not simply to 
provide remote video teleconference capabilities via a secure network.  SOSCOE is 
intended for remote control over MGVs and UGVs, and UAVs, as well as sensor feeds 
and control over long-range strike systems.  This network has been described by its 
designers as “the glue that holds FCS together.”233  
Boeing and SAIC will require $6 billion to design the FCS software alone.234  
This is about three percent of the projected total program cost of $200 billion.235  From a 
business perspective, it makes more sense to design the software first, given the fact that 
the combat effectiveness of the new vehicles depends on the software, and current 
vehicles have heavier armor.236  Furthermore, it is unclear if there are security protocols 
for many of the subcontracts involving writing the computer code.  Countries such as 
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China may attempt to introduce a computer virus or Trojan horse into FCS software 
during the development phase.237  A virus might simply cause the network to fail, but a 
Trojan horse could tap into the functions of the FCS, move vehicle icons on computer 
screens, or cause “friendly” weapons systems to target one another, whereby the FCS 
would destroy itself or initiate hostilities with non-belligerent parties in a deployed area 
of operations. 
SOSCOE is designed in accordance with the Army’s goal for operational 
capabilities, stated in the doctrinal publication FM-1, The Army:   
The goal of Army Operations will be to simultaneously attack critical 
targets throughout the area of operations by rapid maneuver in multiple 
dimensions and precision fires... Improvements in situational 
understanding will facilitate extremely rapid, non-contiguous 
decentralized operations.238  
 
This translates to mean that the Army views its primary future operational role as one of 
destroying targets all over the place at the same time, rather than one at a time in a 
sequential manner.  This is the purpose of the SOSCOE network, by way of long-range 
sensor-to-shooter linkages.  Whether target destruction occurs simultaneously or 
sequentially, however, is a mere technicality, and serves as an inadequate goal for the 
operational capabilities of the U.S. Army.  This operational goal does not correspond 
with political objectives assigned to the Army, such as occupation of territory, control of 
population, or “regime change.”  The statement serves as a reiteration of Cold War 
operational objectives, which called for simultaneously attacking multiple echelons of the 
Soviet Army.  The influence of air power theorists such as John Boyd and John Warden 
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has added new verbiage to old concepts, and are apparent in such doctrinal statements.239  
The statement is based on the idea that the simultaneous use of precision firepower to 
destroy multiple targets will somehow “shock and awe” an opponent.  This may indeed 
facilitate destructive effects on a whole (system, regime leadership, or society) that are 
greater than the sum of the parts.  Regardless, one of the historical roles played by armies 
is to seize territory and control population.  Navies and air forces cannot do this.  The 
U.S. Army will become irrelevant if it neglects this basic role in pursuit of capabilities 
similar to that of the U.S. Air Force.  On the other hand, it is impossible to seize and hold 
territory without first destroying indirect fire systems that serve to deny access to terrain.  
If the latter can be accomplished with sensors, networks, and automated systems 
requiring less personnel, then remainder of personnel should be shifted to permanent 
roles involving control of territory and populations.  
Proponents of FCS contend that tactical problems in Iraq and Afghanistan can be 
addressed with long-range firepower by avoiding the dangerous “close fight” where 
soldiers are killed with IEDs and small arms fire.  The following slide used by retired 
Army General Scales in briefings illustrates this point: 
                                                 
239 David Fadok. “John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis.” 
(Maxwell: Air University Press, 1995),   39. Fadok traces the development of Boyd and Warden’s theories 
regarding the simultaneous attack of multiple targets at different locations with the goal of producing 
strategic paralysis, a sort of “shock and awe.”  Current Army doctrine has similarities with these theories, 
despite the fact that they were developed by fighter pilots, and do not relate to basic aspects of land warfare 
such as the domination of territory or population. 
 65
 
Figure 5: Slide Used to Brief FCS Capabilities  (From Boeing) 
 
Based on this slide, sensor linkages will allow soldiers to “sense and kill outside 
the red zone,” thereby completely avoiding having to address counterinsurgency through 
interaction with the population.240  According to General Stephen Speakes and Colonel 
Gregory Martin, however, “These efficiencies will allow a Future Combat Systems BCT 
to field twice the number of infantrymen as today’s heavy BCTs… with machines 
replacing soldiers in many of the most dangerous tasks.”241  This is based on the notion 
that more “boots on the ground,” though operating from networked armored vehicles, 
suffices to address counterinsurgency.  Ultimately, what matters most is the type of tasks 
these mechanized infantry are asked to perform.  It requires significant training for 
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infantry to perform their existing tasks, as noted by an infantry battalion commander, 
“…there is a notion by some that everyone is an Infantryman in the future force – as if 
anyone can just do it like taking out the garbage or something.  Infantry skills are 
complex and take a lot of quick reflex and physical training to survive.”242  In reality, the 
next generation of infantry, if provided FCS vehicles, will have to learn how to replace 
vehicle track, maintain traditional infantry skills, operate new computer software, and 
address counterinsurgency – all at the same time.    
Critics of the FCS argue that automated long-range sensors and indirect firepower 
are only useful for traditional conventional operations in open terrain against an opponent 
utilizing tanks and other armored vehicles that can be tracked with sensors.  The ability to 
transmit information on wireless tactical data networks, however, may offer significant 
capabilities for irregular warfare by embracing the “close fight” rather than avoiding it.243  
Increased data collection and sharing mechanisms are useful for controlling populations, 
if used for lateral unit coordination by cataloguing individuals in a networked database 
rather than for transmission of targeting data used for artillery or remote controlled 
missiles.  In any case, the current FCS network design is focused on providing “real time 
sensor-to-shooter linkages.”244  The following scenarios illustrate the use of existing 
radar systems with this capability in situations encompassing both traditional and 
irregular challenges.  These systems provide an example of what may be possible with 
the SOSCOE.   
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 Technology such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), Joint Surveillance and 
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and reconnaissance satellites are often attributed 
to increased targeting capability, while the role of field artillery radars developed during 
the same period are often overlooked.  Army radars serve the traditional purpose of 
keeping indirect fire weapon systems out of battlefield action, whether with air defense 
radars that keep away hostile aircraft, or radars designed to locate artillery tubes and 
mortars by tracking the trajectory of fired rounds.  In this latter role, the U.S. Army’s Q-
36 and Q-37 radars played an important role in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.   
After the Gulf War in 1991, an Iraqi artillery battalion commander stated, “after a 
month of bombing, I had 17 of 18 tubes left.  After one day of ground war—with the US 
using Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fires—I had one tube left.”245  In 2002, 
Rumsfeld quoted this statement when testifying before Congress on his plan to cancel 
Crusader.246  He emphasized the MLRS when quoting the Iraqi commander’s statement 
to imply indirect fire rocket systems were more relevant than tube artillery.  Proponents 
of ground forces, however, use the statement as evidence the introduction of ground 
forces proved decisive, since aerial bombardment did not cause the Iraqi Army to 
withdraw from Kuwait.  Ultimately, as evident in Kosovo eight years later, it does not 
matter where the bombardment came from, but rather, how the target was found.  
Ironically, as military and political leaders debated on whether to commit Apache 
helicopters in Kosovo, computer networked radar systems, as part of the supporting 
equipment for the Army’s deployment, played the more decisive role in the conflict.   
1. Counterbattery Radars in Kosovo  
During Operation Allied Force in 1999, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic 
agreed to a peace settlement after 78 days of NATO bombing.  It appeared to some that 
air power alone achieved victory. 247  Assessing why Milosevic capitulated on the 78th 
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day, rather than any other day, reveals the capabilities and limitations of networked 
sensors.  During the Kosovo War, NATO Commander General Wesley Clark’s decision 
to deploy Apache helicopters turned into a fiasco.  The deployment of Apache helicopters 
was slow because the Army never planned on deploying attack helicopters unless they 
were part of a combined arms effort.  Therefore, over 5,000 personnel were deployed in 
support of 24 helicopters.248  Adding to the embarrassment, several helicopters crashed 
during test flights once deployed.  Supporting units for the 24 helicopters included a 
company each of tanks, infantry, and artillery, along with one MLRS platoon.249  Among 
the equipment assigned to field artillery units are the Q-36 and Q-37 (Firefinder series) 
counterbattery radars.250  Since MLRS and howitzers deployed to Kosovo, their 
associated radars also deployed.  These radars played a vital role in the Kosovo conflict, 
despite having only been deployed because a doctrinal chain of reasoning.  
Serbian attempts to conceal artillery pieces from JSTARS and other Air Force 
surveillance assets were largely successful throughout the 78 days of bombing.  Much of 
the Air Force Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) was deemed inaccurate and inflated 
after the conflict because the Serbs used wood burning stoves with angled chimneys to 
mimic artillery pieces.251  They also used water containers that heated in the daytime sun 
to mimic the infrared signature of vehicles and hot artillery tubes.  The Serbian artillery 
repelled attacks by the irregular Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forces backed by the 
CIA, while repositioning faster than the Air Tasking Order (ATO) could be generated.  
Lawyers from each of the NATO participants debated over the ATO targets because of 
differing interpretations of the proportionality principle in international law and 
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became commonplace due to the inability of JSTARS and other surveillance assets to 
accurately find targets.252  In the final weeks of the war, however, the operational picture 
changed dramatically. 
From May 26 to June 7, in the area south of Mount Pastrik, Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) guerillas and Serbian Army forces became locked in an artillery duel.253  
This coincided with the completion of the deployment of equipment accompanying the 
Army’s 24 helicopters.  Although the Serbian artillery hid from the JSTARS, it could not 
hide from the Army’s Firefinder radars.  When the Serbian artillery fired, these radars 
acquired their position based on the trajectory of the rounds and relayed this information 
via the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).  The AFATDS is 
capable of electronically integrating the management of artillery fires, close air support, 
and naval gunfire.254  This data management system allowed accurate coordinates for 
Serbian artillery to be passed on to planners.   
Apache helicopters played no role in the Kosovo War, although their supporting 
planning staffs and equipment played a significant role.  U.S. Army corps level planners 
in the Battlefield Coordination Element (originally created to coordinate “deep 
operations” against second echelons of the Soviet Army in accordance with AirLand 
Battle) stated the following:   
The CAOC Ground Analysis Cell tried to fill the void as the TF Hawk 
ACE/G2 focused solely on developing targets for Apache helicopter 
engagement areas in Kosovo. After realizing that the Apaches would not 
be employed in Allied Force, TF Hawk began to nominate targets to the 
CAOC through the BCE.255 
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This complex jargon translates to mean that Army planners passed Firefinder radar 
targets to Air Force planners, since the Apache helicopters were too vulnerable to utilize 
in a tactical environment where the other side shoots back.256   
Once the Air Force demonstrated the capacity to hit something other than wood 
burning stoves, perhaps Milosevic took threats from the air more seriously, as he agreed 
to settle the conflict three days after the first bomb was dropped on a target acquired by 
Firefinder radar.  Milosevic realized that NATO could finally target his artillery, and 
chose to withdraw with his army still intact.257  In retrospect, Milosevic stated that he 
agreed to a peace settlement with NATO because of concerns regarding civilian 
casualties from bombings, as the U.S. started bombing electrical grids and other civilian 
infrastructure targets.  In reality, however, the Q-36 and Q-37 acquisitions put Milosevic 
in an awkward position.  At this point, the next logical step for the Serbian Army would 
be to emplace artillery pieces next to schools or other locations in close proximity to 
civilians. These actions would have turned the population against Milosevic.           
Modern warfare involves complex systems that function in a manner greater than 
the sum of their parts.  Nevertheless, it is important to determine which cogs in the war 
machine proved decisive.  At the tactical level, the Serbian Army faced mortal danger 
because of a U.S. Army warrant officer’s decision on where to emplace counterbattery 
radars.  This decision caused a private to park a truck somewhere, making sure the 
generator powering the radar had fuel before taking a nap in the cab of the truck, soothed 
by the steady drone of the engine.258  Meanwhile, generals, lawyers, pilots, and even the 
President of the United States, debated the targets of the next bombing run and whether to 
commit the helicopters.  After the conflict, General Jumper, the commander of the United 
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States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) stated that the counterbattery radars of the U.S. 
Army played “a very big part” in the final stages of the campaign.259   
After planners released control over stove-piped information out of frustration, 
the Firefinder radar became the key link in the “system of systems” that caused Milosevic 
to capitulate.  The only significant tasks personnel operating this sort of system perform 
involve positioning equipment and refueling, thereby allowing the war machine to take 
on a life of its own.  This is not the view of modern war that professional warriors would 
subscribe, and evident with the focus on direct-fire weapon systems such as the Apache, 
which is nothing more than a vulnerable infantryman in the sky with a vast amount of 
firepower.    
Attack helicopters are modern-age expressions of traditional military culture.  The 
Apache is loud and menacing, designed to cast aside all danger and fight at treetop level, 
contrasted against an open sky, serving as the ultimate expression of institutional culture, 
camouflaged in high-technology form.  This became evident to the Army three years after 
the Kosovo experience.  During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 11th Aviation Regiment, 
consisting of Apache helicopters, conducted a full retreat after receiving a hail of fire 
from AK-47s while conducting their first “deep attack” of the war.260  From the 
perspective of military culture, the AK-47 is more advanced than the Apache, as it was 
the first rifle adopted by a modern army that did not have a bayonet lug.261  In contrast, 
the M-16 has a bayonet lug, and U.S. Army basic training still contains countless hours of 
bayonet drill, bayonet obstacle courses, and learning how to march like automata in 
compact formations. 
The Apache exists because of events that long preceded it, such as the 1948 Key 
West Agreement, whereby the U.S. Air Force was no longer obligated to provide fire 
support to ground forces.  This resulted from a course set much earlier.  During World 
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War I, units of horse cavalrymen from several armies were spared the horrors of war, at 
the behest of traditionalists waiting to exploit a breakthrough that never occurred.  These 
units waited impatiently far behind the trench lines, with personnel shifting to other roles, 
such as aviation.262  Once these cavalrymen took flight, after crossing the trench lines 
from above, their imaginations took flight with them also – flying past the gun lines – 
believing they could deliver war’s decisive blow directly against a society.263  The 
Apache is an equally absurd counter-reaction to these air power theories.  The reality of 
modern war falls somewhere between the F-117 Stealth bomber and the Apache, and is 
manifested in frustrated staff officers, and a soundly sleeping private waking only to 
refuel generators.  The Kosovo War highlights a growing divide between Army and Air 
Force capabilities and focus.  This divide inspired the Army to develop something better 
than the Apache for fire support, and this is manifested in the SOSCOE.   
2. Counterbattery Radars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
During Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002, American and Afghan forces 
became pinned down in a complex ambush that included preplanned enemy mortar 
fire.264  Close air support was not immediately available, and the exact location of the 
enemy indirect fire systems was unknown.  During the operation, eight Americans were 
killed and at least forty were wounded.265  Shortly after this incident, the Army quietly 
deployed a light field artillery battalion from the 10th Mountain Division, equipped with 
Q-36 and Q-37 radars.  These radar sections combined with one platoon of guns became 
expertly versed in the artillery counterstrike drill, while the rest of the artillerymen 
adopted non-traditional roles.  Counterstrike drills were practiced so that howitzers in the 
“hot platoon” could fire at the grid location of enemy mortars within minutes of radar 
                                                 
262 O’Connell,   262. 
263 Europeans, after experiencing the destructiveness of two World Wars, abandoned these concepts as 
they relate to international law.  The United States, on the other hand, has not ratified Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Convention regarding the targeting of civilians in war. 
264 Keith Everett. “Not a Good Day to Die.” Infantry Magazine. (Jan-Feb 2006). 
265 CNN. “Operation Anaconda Costs 8 Lives.” (4 March 2002). At: 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/03/04/ret.afghan.fighting/index.html. Accessed on 
10 Feb 08. 
 73
acquisition.  This assured that friendly forces maintained the ability to maneuver and 
never again received sustained indirect fire during future combat operations. 266    
The same counterstrike drills adopted in Afghanistan are only useful in the 
countryside of Iraq.267  Use of artillery strikes against rocket and mortar firing points has 
limited utility in crowded urban terrain because it causes excessive collateral damage.  
Furthermore, it is difficult for side-scanning radars to track objects that may be blocked 
by tall buildings.  Because of these concerns, and the time necessary to clear crowded 
urban airspace prior to firing rounds, artillery counterstrikes are only used in remote areas 
of Iraq.  In any case, radar still plays a vital role.  The coordinates for the point of origin 
(POO) of a mortar attack can be transmitted to all friendly patrols near the launch.  
Patrols can quickly move to the location or isolate it by establishing roadblocks and 
checkpoints where cars are searched.  Civilians in the area can be politely questioned and 
those in a hurry to leave can first have their hands tested for explosive residue.  Also, 
UAVs can fly to the POO to track the escape route of insurgents.  In these situations, 
using networked sensors, the exact location of the enemy is known.  This information is 
only marginally useful in urban terrain, as units must maneuver aggressively to reach the 
location.   
Silencing the enemy’s indirect fires allows ground forces to operate in hostile 
terrain.  As evident in Afghanistan, infantry cannot maneuver if faced with a significant 
number of these systems.  Efforts to find and destroy artillery, rockets, and mortars are 
necessary in order to project ground forces into hostile areas.  Winning wars is not simply 
a matter of putting more “boots on the ground” at some magical decisive point.  It must 
not be forgotten, however, how they got there in the first place.  The remote destruction 
of indirect fire systems located by various sensors is merely the price for entry.  After 
arrival, depending on the nature of the political objective, there are additional burdens.  
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3. Counterbattery Radar Developments 
The next generation of Firefinder radar, the Q-47, appears similar to the last 
generation.  It consists of a tall standing rectangular panel on a trailer towed by a truck 
(LMTV) with electric generators.  It is capable of registering and adjusting friendly 
artillery fire while simultaneously monitoring hostile fire from up to 50 different 
locations at ranges from four to three hundred kilometers.268  Hostile artillery coordinates 
are digitally transmitted to a variety of other weapon systems using two separate 
communications networks.269  The Q-47 can roll-on and roll-off a C-130 aircraft without 
disassembly.  Once deployed, it can be emplaced in 15 minutes and displaced in 7 
minutes.270   The Q-47 only offers a marginal improvement in capability in comparison 
to Firefinder radar proposals made by civilians much earlier.  The Q-36 radar, though 
designed in the 1970s, is actually more relevant today than the Q-47 because it tracks at 
close range.  The Q-47 only tracks targets beyond four kilometers, at distances that 
correspond to the location of the second and third attacking echelons of the nonexistent 
Soviet Army.  This radar cannot track mortars that are typically fired on bases in Iraq and 
Afghanistan at closer ranges.  As a result of this shortfall, Special Operations Command, 
using its independent acquisitions authority, recently purchased the Lightweight Counter 
Mortar Radar.  This radar tracks at short range (up to 7,000 meters) in 360 degrees, and is 
more useful in an irregular environment.271  
At an IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) conference in 
Dallas, Texas in 1998, attendees from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) presented 
the concept of the airborne Firefinder radar.  The idea resulted from observation of earlier 
targeting situations in Bosnia.  The IDA project determined the feasibility of putting 
Firefinder radar on the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle by modifying the existing 
synthetic aperture radar.  The increase in computing power since the development of the 
Q-36 and Q-37 radars in the 1970s theoretically allows an airborne radar to distinguish a 
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small target from a large clutter return.  IDA calculated the “backscatter coefficient” 
necessary to decrease the target-to-clutter ratio, and the manner that in flight GPS 
accuracy affected the calculations.272   
In a 2005 report, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
expressed the need for “persistent global and theater surveillance… across a wide range 
of battlefield scenarios.”273  These endeavors were intended to assist the U.S. Air Force 
in finding targets.274  The report mentioned Firefinder radars, yet introduced the 
possibility that a satellite, launched into low-earth orbit, could track mortar launches in 
urban terrain, by scanning from above to avoid being blocked by tall buildings.  
Engineers calculated, “At steeper depression angles, target velocity projected to the 
sensor is multiplied by the cosine of the depression angle.”275  Launching a satellite into 
orbit to find the origin of an indirect fire attack is an extravagant concept.  Adversaries 
can render this satellite obsolete by simply attaching a cheap $12 timer to rockets 
launched from pipe tubes leaned against a rock.  These are unnecessarily expensive 
attempts to counter inexpensive problems.  Ultimately, the U.S. Air Force is not 
concerned with destroying artillery, unless it is part of an air defense system.  The 
acquisition of indirect fire systems will continue to be conducted from the ground, even 
though the Air Force is increasingly called upon to destroy these targets.  Regardless, the 
combined capabilities of the Army and Air Force in this area has proven sufficient to 
project ground forces into positions where they must address other concerns. 
4. Analysis of Networked Sensors (SOSCOE) 
The Kosovo War was followed by debates with extreme views regarding the role 
of air and land forces.  The U.S. Army’s networked radar systems, resembling that 
envisioned by SOSCOE, played an important, yet mostly overlooked role in Kosovo, 
                                                 
272 Roger Sullivan, Jeffrey Nicoll, and James Ralson.  “Airborne Firefinder Radar Concept.” Abstract. 
Presented at the 1998 National Radar Conference at Dallas, TX (12-13 May 1998),   88. 
273 Tim Clark. (Program Manager, Special Projects Office). “Tailored Tactical Surveillance.” 
DARPATech. (9 August 2005). At: http://www.darpa.mil/DARPATech2005/presentations/spo/clark.pdf.   
160. 
274 Ibid.,   163. 
275 Clark,   263. 
 76
Afghanistan, and Iraq.  These systems, although impressive, are not based on recent 
conceptions.  Transfer protocols, routers, and packet switching – all part of today’s 
Internet – were made possible by the creation of SAGE (Semi Automatic Ground 
Environment).  This networked system of sensors, developed in the 1950s, spanned all of 
North America.276  The SOSCOE may offer significantly increased situational awareness 
for ground forces, but it is not a new idea.  Therefore, it is important to examine past 
situations involving similar systems.  In irregular warfare, SOSCOE’s focus on 
situational awareness at extended ranges may degrade from situational awareness where 
it is actually necessary.  Assuming it were possible for the U.S. Army, armed with long 
range strike systems, to track every human being in a theater of operations that had a 
hostile intention toward it, would this assist with the goal of spreading democracy?       
C. INFORMATION AGE WARFARE 
 The original purpose of computer networking was to link sensors monitoring for a 
Soviet nuclear attack, and to ensure the survival of command and control systems for 
nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack.  These efforts assured that the United 
States had the ability to retaliate, amidst such chaotic circumstances.  After the Cold War, 
these communications technologies offer unforeseen capabilities such as the Internet.  
Today, the U.S. Army is attempting to create mechanized ground forces utilizing 27-ton 
vehicles connected by a common network.  When testifying before the U.S. Senate in 
2005, Paul Francis, of the Government Accountability Office, summarized the FCS 
concept with the following: 
 
The essence of the FCS concept itself -- to provide the lethality and 
survivability of the current heavy force with the sustainability and 
responsiveness of a force that weighs a fraction as much -- has the 
intrinsic attraction of doing more with less.277 
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Regardless of the technology, a plan involving “doing more with less” is a matter of 
considering how much to gamble with the lives of soldiers to accomplish feats that may 
not be possible with existing resource allocations.  It is a matter of taking ever-greater 
risks to even the playing field.  This is the most basic aspect of maneuver warfare, as 
interpreted by Jomini from observing Napoleon.  Doing more with less is 
characteristically different from doing more with more, or doing less with more, though 
the latter might not inspire the innovation and boldness that emerges from scarcity and 
desperation.       
 Army bases are situated in the middle of places such as Texas, Colorado, 
Oklahoma, and Kansas.  These locations were originally intended to facilitate rapid 
deployment of horse cavalry to fight against various Indian tribes that no longer exist.  
Naturally, politicians want to keep these bases in their districts, and there are reasonable 
concerns over whether adequate sized training areas exist elsewhere, or if the cost of new 
infrastructure outweighs maintenance costs of the old.  Some of the problems associated 
with the Army’s current rapid deployment scheme may be more a factor of these 
constraints rather than whether a vehicle is too heavy to fit on a C-130 or C-17.  
Regardless, few countries can project land forces to a hostile environment at distances the 
U.S. Army is currently engaged.  Therefore, improving current capability in this area may 
not prove as relevant as addressing what happens after the forces arrive.  Otherwise, there 
is no point in deploying forces in the first place.       
The FCS is based on the idea that information obtained from sensors can allow for 
the remote application of violence, thereby negating the need for heavy armor protection.  
Although there are numerous shortcomings with such a concept, the logic itself is not 
flawed.  The irregular warrior has already adopted this logic, evident with the Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED).  This precision weapon system can be employed remotely, 
coordinated by modern information networks, and operated by personnel speaking the 
same language as the local population – all without having to burn a million gallons of 
JP-8 each day.   
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V. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND BUDGET POLITICS 
Congress recently expressed concern that the FCS may not provide adequate 
capabilities for irregular warfare, and that it is merely an incremental improvement of the 
Army’s capabilities for traditional warfare.278  The 2006 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) both define irregular warfare as a form 
of war fought by unconventional forces in which the enemy is not necessarily a state.279  
Both documents mention that irregular warfare is currently the prevalent form of war.  
This definition is vague, and allows the military branches to continue planning 
predictable force structures with little constraint.  A special study on irregular warfare by 
the U.S. Joint Forces Command concludes that it should “reject addressing irregular 
warfare as a term or construct in joint doctrine” since its definition is unclear in the 
National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 
Terrorism and therefore not to include it in the Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms or any other joint publications.280  The study goes on to 
conclude that older terms such as Unconventional Warfare, Stability Operations, Civil-
Military Operations, and Counterinsurgency should continue to be used instead.  The 
inability to agree on a definition for a form of warfare that does not fit into “traditional” 
ways of thinking is illustrative of a military bureaucracy that has been conditioned by the 
Cold War.  The QDR describes traditional warfare as “familiar,” while irregular warfare 
is described as “prevalent.”  This language implies that the military is unfamiliar with 
prevalent trends in warfare and should quickly become familiar.  The FCS program is the 
Army’s attempt to address new trends in warfare.281   
                                                 
278 Andrew Feickert. “The Army’s Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress.” 
CRS Report for Congress. (11 October 2007),   14. 
279 Donald Rumsfeld. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. United States Department of Defense. 
(February 2006),   3; Also: National Security Strategy   44. 
280 United States Joint Forces Command. Irregular Warfare Special Study (4 August 2006). At: 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/DigitalCollections/IrregWarfareSpecialStudy.pdf ,  5-6.  The current motto of 
this institution is, “Leading the way in Transformation.” 
281 Although the program began in 1999, prior to the publication of the recent QDR and NSS, the 
Army believes that the FCS is ideal for irregular warfare.    
 80
A. FINDING KING ARTHUR’S SWORD 
This chapter assesses the capabilities of FCS weapon systems in irregular warfare, 
given the context of budget politics.  Weapon systems will be examined in relation to the 
branch of the Army they are associated with.  Army doctrine is based on “combined arms 
warfare.”  The U.S. Army uses this term to refer to a combination of tanks, artillery, 
helicopters, and mechanized infantry, in an attempt to emphasize “teamwork” while 
simultaneously serving as a bureaucratic political tool to equalize the lobbying power of 
each branch.  The FCS is referred to as a “system of systems” in the latest continuation of 
the notion of “combined arms,” which also has been referred to as the “modern system” 
of force employment.282  The only feasible solution to a problem (irregular warfare) 
faced by a bureaucratic institution, such as the Army, is to bestow equal monetary 
blessings to all competing subdivisions of the institution during a period of reform.     
To explain how bureaucratic politics influences the outcome of political 
decisions, Graham Allison introduced the proposition, “Where you stand depends on 
where you sit.”283  This proposition fits well with the Army’s internal power sharing 
mechanisms as well as its budget competition with other services.  The head of each 
branch of the Army is referred to as a “Chief,” and in this role, they each promote the 
interests of their branch.  Naturally, the artillery branch wants new guns, the aviation 
branch wants new helicopters, and the armor branch claims that everyone would be safer 
in an armored vehicle.  This is no different from the behavior of the Air Force, which 
claims it needs more fighter aircraft; and the Navy, which claims it needs more aircraft 
carriers and new battleships.  This sort of “joint” transformation pays lip service to 
irregular warfare by claiming that new tanks (FCS), battleships (Littoral Combat Ship, 
LCS), and aircraft (F-22 Raptor) are ideal for fighting terrorists.  The most startling 
example of this trend is evident with the National Laboratories, which have proposed new  
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nuclear weapons, such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), as a way of 
dealing with terrorists hiding stockpiles of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons 
underground.284   
The artillery and aviation branches are based exclusively on technological 
advances, while infantry is as old as warfare itself, and armor is based upon mounted 
warfare and the traditions of horse cavalry.  The artillery and aviation branches have 
promoted some of the most expensive weapon systems in recent times, such as the 
Crusader and Comanche helicopter.285  Infantry is usually the final bastion of tradition in 
any military institution, since it is based on a form of fighting that has proven relatively 
difficult to leverage or “transform” with new technology.  Therefore, the armor branch 
has taken on the role of lobbying for the infantry branch.  The recent Base Realignment 
and Closing (BRAC) Commission mandated a merger between the armor and infantry 
branch, which will take effect by 2012, creating a “maneuver branch,” which will 
consolidate training functions performed by the armor and infantry schools at Fort 
Benning, Georgia.286   
In recent times, the two most influential branches inside the Army, from an 
equipment and doctrinal perspective, are the artillery and armor branches.  Manpower 
constraints (internally perceived) and technological fanaticism have caused the Army to 
rely on long-range strike systems and armor protection to a degree that inhibits the 
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institution’s ability to address irregular warfare.287  The merger of the armor and infantry 
branches is mirrored with the merger of field artillery and air defense artillery branches to 
create a “fires branch.”  This consolidation occurred in 2007 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.       
The first components of the Future Combat System scheduled for production are 
intended for the Army’s Field Artillery Branch, which earned the nickname “King of 
Battle” during World War I.  Much like the King Arthur of legend, the Field Artillery 
Branch must find its Excalibur in order to be “King of Battle” in the information age.  
Prior to the Future Combat System, the Army’s last major weapons program on the 
defense budget was the “Crusader” artillery system.288  Crusader was meant to replace 
the aging “Paladin.”  Despite mechanical upgrades, computers, and the ability to receive 
digital fire missions, the final act in firing the Paladin’s 155mm cannon involves pulling a 
string.  Prior to this act, soldiers must hand-load the shell, fuse, and several powder bags.  
In contrast, the FCS Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) has an auto-loading 
ammunition cylinder and push-button firing mechanism.  This reflects the institution’s 
perception of the information age, whereby wars are not won by pulling strings, but 
instead by pushing buttons, with labor-intensive tasks performed using mechanization.  
While these measures may increase the capacity to shoot artillery rounds, they are not 
necessarily relevant for irregular warfare.   
Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that Crusader was too 
expensive and a relic of the Cold War.  He cancelled the Crusader program in 2002, 
stating, “While a technological advancement over the Paladin howitzer, it was conceived 
for a traditional, mass force counterattack role.”289  Additionally, in a testimony before 
the Senate Armed Forces Committee, he stated: 
In short, the decision to recommend that we skip Crusader is one that 
emphasizes accelerating the shift to precision munitions of all indirect fire 
                                                 
287 Additionally, increasing the number of infantrymen does not provide the same benefit to various 
Congressional districts as increasing the number of weapon systems that would potentially be produced in 
Congressional districts throughout the country.  This phenomenon was evident when Congress provided 
funds for more Mine Resistance Armored Vehicles than the Army and Marines believed necessary. 
288 Crusader and Comanche, though conceived prior to the Future Combat System, were intended to 
become part of the system prior to being cut from the budget. 
289 Donald Rumsfeld, “Prepared Statement on the Crusader Recommendation before the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services.” (16 May 2002),   12. 
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systems—cannon as well as rocket, Marine Corps as well as Army. Our 
recommendation is not to abandon the technologies already developed by 
the Crusader program. In fact, it would ensure that the key pieces of 
Crusader technology are maintained for use in both the Army’s Future 
Combat System, and possibly in the advanced gun system the Navy is 
developing for its future surface combatants.290 
 
This statement served to alleviate concerns of various Senators representing states where 
Crusader was to be manufactured.  Fierce criticism of Rumsfeld’s decision came from 
Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe.291  He argued that Rumsfeld’s estimates on the number 
of C-17s required to deploy the Crusader were too high because they included the weight 
of ammunition.292  Coincidently, Fort Sill, Oklahoma is the home of the Field Artillery 
Branch.  A civilian official working for the Army was later fired for providing talking 
points on Crusader to supporters in Congress.293  Rumsfeld’s suggestive linkage of the 
Army’s weapons to the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship served to expand 
Congressional interest while mitigating criticisms of transformation.294  Although 
Crusader was cancelled, the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and NLOS-C 
have taken its place.  These systems will increase the Army’s indirect firepower 
capability in terms of quantity, range, and precision.  This renewed effort, with an 
emphasis on precision, has salvaged the spirit of Crusader in the form of Excalibur.   
B. EXCALIBUR (XM982)  
Although the new NLOS-C artillery vehicle does not yet have a name associated 
with Arthurian legend, it will fire the 155mm Excalibur (XM982) artillery round.  
Excalibur is the only component of the FCS that has been assigned a real name in 
addition to some typical form of descriptive acronym and military nomenclature (usually 
                                                 
290 Rumsfeld, “Crusader Recommendation.”   11. 
291 Terrence Smith. “Scrapping Crusader.” Online News Hour (16 May 2002) At: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june02/crusader_5-16.html.  Accessed on 10 Jan 08. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 By linking FCS to LCS, Rumsfeld secured support for “transformation” from Congressional 
districts that supported shipbuilding as well as artillery systems manufacturing.  
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a combination of letters and numbers).295   Like the mythical weapon system employed 
by King Arthur, the new Excalibur artillery round also strikes with a three to nine meter 
accuracy.296  When fired at a high arc, Excalibur comes crashing almost vertically from 
the sky to strike a target in urban terrain without being blocked by tall buildings.  Like the 
Air Force’s JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition), this round can also be guided by the 
Global Positioning System to ensure accuracy.  This is an improvement upon the 
capability of Copperhead artillery rounds that required continuous lasing of a target by 
exposed ground personnel.  It is merely an incremental improvement on existing Army 
technologies, however, and it does not provide increased capability in irregular warfare.  
The Air Force B-52 Stratofortress, with a payload of JDAMs, can provide a similar 
capability with global range, though proponents of artillery make the point that aircraft 
cannot provide timely, sustained, and organic fire support.297  The new Excalibur round 
can be fired from existing artillery systems as well as new FCS artillery vehicles. The 
existing artillery systems that can fire Excalibur, however, were designed before 
Vietnam.  Although the age of the artillery tubes or aircraft delivering various munitions 
does not make a difference from a tactical standpoint, it is central to bureaucratic 
arguments for new weapon systems. 
C. ARTILLERY SYSTEMS AND PERSONNEL AT THE BRIGADE AND 
DIVISION LEVEL 
The U.S. Army has sharply increased its reliance on indirect fire systems during 
the past three decades in terms of quantity, range, and precision.  Although attritional 
warfare and artillery barrages did not bring success in Vietnam, the momentum of these 
efforts continued after Vietnam as the Army placed renewed emphasis on the mission of 
defending Western Europe.  In contrast to the Abrams and Bradley, current artillery 
systems are much older.  Therefore, FCS vehicles intended to replace artillery systems 
                                                 
295 The names assigned to weapon systems illustrate the underlying focus of an institution.  For 
example, the Air Force’s only plane purposefully designed for providing close air support for the Army is 
named “Warthog” (A-10) while other aircraft such as the “Eagle” (F-15) and “Falcon” (F-16) are named 
after majestic birds.  Interestingly, the F-22 “Raptor” is named after an extinct dinosaur. 
296 Tommy James Tracy. “Field Artillery at the Crossroads of Transformation.” Military Review. 
(January 2004),   33.  
297 The term “organic” refers to a unit having operational ownership and control over an asset. 
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are first in the order of production, while those intended to replace the Abrams and 
Bradley will be produced last.298  The field artillery branch was passed over and left 
“pulling strings” (both literally and in the figurative political sense) in the aftermath of 
the 1980s acquisition of the “Big Five” weapons systems, which did not include a new 
artillery piece.  The artillery branch continued to depend on systems such as Paladin, 
designed in the early 1960s.  Nevertheless, the amount of artillery assigned to units 
increased in the past three decades.  As the Army acquired new tanks and helicopters, 
proponents of the Field Artillery Branch desperately pointed out the longer ranges of 
Soviet-designed artillery systems, including those used by Iraq in 1991 and 2003.299    
After Vietnam, the Army increased the number or artillery tubes in a division 
from fifty-four to ninety-six, an 80% increase.300  While this may have been a relevant 
measure against the threat of the Warsaw Pact, it is unclear why the Army is increasing 
the number of artillery systems once again.  The current force has thirty artillery pieces at 
the brigade level.301  The proposed Future Combat System brigade will have forty-two 
vehicle-based artillery systems plus sixty unmanned missile systems.302  This is a 340% 
increase in artillery, rocket, and mortar systems at the brigade level.   
                                                 
298 However, the vehicles will all share a common chassis. 
299 Tommy James Tracy,   37.  Additionally, North Korean artillery has longer ranges.  However, 
many of the higher range estimates are based on towed tubes that are not self propelled.   
300 Boyd L. Dastrup. King of Battle: A History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery Branch. (Fort 
Monroe: Office of the Command Historian of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 
1992),   298. 
301 This estimate includes mortar vehicles as well as howitzers.  Mortars do not belong to the FA 
branch, but they are considered here in the same category of indirect fire weapons.   
302 This includes the NLOS-LS as well as mortars.  Typically, mortars are considered as equipment 
belonging to maneuver elements such as armor or infantry.  In this analsysis, they are considered by 
function, rather than where they fall on tables of organization. 
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Table 2: FCS Replacements for Current Vehicles (From CRS) 
 
The goal of Army Transformation is to "shift weight" from Cold War legacy 
weapon systems, yet the institution still devotes significant resources to traditional 
weapon systems at the cost of reducing the number of assets devoted to irregular warfare.  
The emphasis on long-range firepower is misplaced, considering the short range at which 
forces might engage the enemy in irregular warfare.  Many observers have noted that 
after multiple deployments to Iraq, Army units have successfully adopted 
counterinsurgency methods.  This is not because units are enabled by new equipment or 
weapons.  Instead, it is because units are finding new ways of employing or disregarding 
their traditional resources.  The disregard of tradition is evident in the manner that field 
artillery personnel are currently being employed.   
Over half of all field artillery captains graduating from the career course at Ft. Sill 
will move to assignments as military advisors in Iraq rather than as artillery battery 
commanders, due to the increased need for advisors and decreased need for artillery 
barrages in irregular warfare. As a new generation of traditional weapon systems 
becomes available, however, these personnel assignment changes will most likely be 
temporary.  A young field artillery captain recently captured this idea when saying the 
following: "I became an officer to be a commander; now I'm going to have to wait longer.  
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The (military advisor) teams are taking us from our traditional roles as artillerymen."303  
However, remote systems such as the NLOS-LS do not require “command” in the 
traditional sense.  For this reason, manned systems such as Crusader have been 
resurrected in the form of the NLOS Cannon, a vehicle based artillery system scheduled 
to be the first FCS vehicle in production. 
Army Transformation is based on the idea that capability across the “full-
spectrum” of conflict is a matter of applying varying doses of firepower.  Low-intensity 
conflict is viewed as something that can be addressed by delivering a small, precise 
volume of firepower, while high-intensity conflict is a matter of delivering larger 
volumes of firepower with less regard for accuracy.  This is a flawed perception.  
Addressing the political aspects warfare, whether traditional or irregular, is not simply a 
matter of shooting various types of artillery rounds or maneuvering armored vehicles into 
certain positions.  Political problems cannot be reduced to engineering problems.       
Eleven of the fourteen FCS components are designed to deliver long-range fires, 
resupply munitions, or assist in the targeting process.  Unmanned robot logistics vehicles 
and air-droppable ammunition cylinders are intended to resupply the artillery.  The only 
manned ground vehicles not associated with either managing or delivering some form of 
long-range firepower are the medical vehicle, recovery and maintenance vehicle, and 
infantry carrier (although it will have a 30mm cannon for direct fire engagements).  The 
chart below illustrates the distribution of these systems in a brigade:     
                                                 




Table 3: Planned FCS Components in Brigade Combat Team (From CRS) 
 
 89
A 2007 issue of Field Artillery features articles entitled, “Cultural Awareness,” 
and “What the hell is an NGO?”304  These types of topics are published in the 
professional journal of the artillery branch to meet the needs artillerymen who are 
struggling to grasp irregular warfare.  Other articles offer guidance on how to transform 
Paladin batteries into maneuver units that conduct police functions.  These are the types 
of tasks currently conducted by deployed artillery units.  Additionally, forward observers 
attached to maneuver units typically perform civil affairs functions rather facilitating fire 
support.  These developments have sparked concern among many in the branch over the 
future role of artillery.      
The annual “state of the field artillery” issue of Field Artillery alleviates concerns 
about the future of artillery.  In this issue, the Chief of the Artillery points out the myriad 
of roles played by artillerymen, “We have acted as Infantrymen, Military Policemen and 
transporters and conducted hurricane disaster relief.”305  He goes on to say, “If we’re not 
careful, we could end up with a generation of FA Soldiers who lack proficiency and 
experience in providing fire support to the ground commander.”306   These legitimate 
concerns capture the problem of facing irregular warfare while simultaneously 
maintaining traditional warfare skills.  To address this problem, the artillery branch has 
pinned its hopes on the belief that new precision artillery and rocket systems will suffice 
to address irregular warfare through traditional skills. General Martin Dempsey, former 
commander of 1st Armored Division, is quoted in Field Artillery saying, “the current 
employment of the FA in non-FA tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq will not always be the 
rule.”307   He goes on to say, “maintain your ability to provide full-spectrum fires.”308  
This reinforces the notion that the traditional tasks associated with firing artillery rounds 
will continue to be relevant across the “full-spectrum” once new types of artillery rounds 
are developed.  
                                                 
304 Field Artillery. (January-February 2004). 
305 David Ralston. “State of the Field Artillery.” Field Artillery. (November-December 2006),   2. 
306 Ibid.  
307 Mark Brock. “The Field Artillery is Alive and Well: In Fact Thriving.” Field Artillery. (July 
2006),   21. 
308 Ibid. 
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The Future Combat System's NLOS-LS (Non-Line of Sight Launch System) 
component began as the idea to have fifteen “rockets in a box” that could be dropped by a 
C-130 or put on the back of a truck, and left unattended, capable of precision fires 
anywhere within a 200-kilometer radius, with a capability to loiter and “hunt” for 45 
minutes.309  Based on these capabilities, an entire armored brigade worth of tanks can be 
destroyed in less than one hour with four boxes of rockets working in conjunction with 
remote sensors in open terrain, given a traditional warfare scenario.  In irregular warfare, 
the current employment of rocket systems is suggestive of the manner in which systems 
such as the NLOS-LS might be employed.  
The Army’s current rocket artillery system is the Multiple Launch Rocket System 
(MLRS).  A new GPS guided rocket for this system completed “testing” in Ramadi in 
2007.310  In irregular warfare, the MLRS is deployed as a stand-alone system rather than 
as part of a larger battery organization.  The GMLRS (Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket 
System) Unitary proved to be the “weapon of choice” in Ramadi during 2007.311  An 
article written by officers employing the weapon in Ramadi mentions the lower risk 
estimate distances (REDs) and collateral damage estimates (CDEs) of the new GMLRS 
precision munitions in comparison to the JDAM.312  This capability allowed the 
munitions to destroy specific buildings without damaging nearby buildings.  While it may 
seem relevant, destroying buildings tends to enrage large portions of population, whether 
on Wall Street in New York or Haifa Street in Baghdad.313  Proponents argue that such 
systems are necessary to provide fire support.  Although the need for fire support is a 
relevant concern, new capabilities have the potential to increase casualty averse behavior, 
by creating the opportunity to expend enormous firepower to save lives.     
                                                 
309 “Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS),” At: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/net-fires.htm.  Accessed on 15 Nov 07. 
310 Andrew Lantz and Paul Weyrauch. “GMLRS Unitary Battle Drill and the Ready First Combat 
Team.” Field Artillery. (March-April 2007),   35.  The article contains of photograph of the rocket 
impacting a building in Ramadi with caption stating that this was the “testing,” and that the rocket did not 
destroy nearby buildings in the photograph. 
311 Ibid.,   35. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Numerous abandoned buildings in Iraq that were once part of Saddam’s military industrial 
complex are now inhabited by homeless Iraqis.  
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Fire support for “troops in contact” (TIC) is the highest tactical priority for 
aircraft and artillery systems.314  As troops become exposed to more danger, attempting 
to increase presence to better “secure the population,” this causes an increase in the use of 
indirect fire, and has spurred a competition between artillery assets and aircraft in order 
to prove their relevance, at the expense of making the Iraqi population less safe from 
collateral damage.  This inter-service rivalry was evident during 2007, as the Army 
surged combat power and adopted new tactics.  In response to the Army’s actions, Air 
Force General Charles Dunlap stated, “Unfortunately, starry-eyed enthusiasts have 
misread the (counterinsurgency) manual to say that defeating an insurgency is all about 
winning hearts and minds with teams of anthropologists, propagandists and civil-affairs 
officers armed with democracy-in-a-box kits and volleyball nets.”315  He argued that the 
“fivefold increase in airstrikes during 2007 as compared with the previous year,” as a 
result of the surge, “proved to be highly successful” in suppressing the level of violence 
in Iraq.316   
The struggle for relevance in providing fire support is evident from the Army 
perspective in a Military Review article that highlights how the Russians used ground 
based artillery rather than air power to destroy “terrorist targets” in over 70% of indirect 
fire engagements during the second Chechnya War.317  This point is used to highlight the 
need for more artillery rather than aircraft in U.S. efforts to fight terrorists.  Regardless of 
which view prevails, there is one certainty: in learning how to fight against the Russians 
in “traditional warfare,” the United States has learned how to fight like them in “irregular 
warfare.”     
                                                 
314 In the aftermath of major combat operations, this becomes the only purpose for such systems, as 
they are otherwise idle. 
315 Charles Dunlap. “We Still Need the Big Guns.” New York Times. (9 January 2008). 
316 Ibid.  
317 Tommy Tracy. “Field Artillery at the Crossroads of Transformation.” Military Review. (January-
February 2004).   33. 
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D. FINISHING DECISIVELY: THE COMBAT ARM OF DECISION 
The traditions of horse cavalry continue in the Armor Branch.318  In the 19th 
Century, cavalry units believed their role was to “crown victory” using “cold steel” while 
mounted on horses.319  Today, tankers believe their role is to “finish decisively” by 
closing with the enemy using armor protection, shock effect, and a large cannon 
employed in a direct-fire manner.  Saber drill has been replaced with tank gunnery, while 
horse grooming has been replaced with track lubrication.  Victory in irregular warfare 
cannot be “crowned” while “mounted,” whether on horses, tanks, aircraft, or even aircraft 
carriers.       
The Mounted Combat System (MCS) is the next generation of tank, intended to 
replace the Abrams tank in the modular brigade structure.  The estimated cruising range 
of the MCS is 300 kilometers, while that of the Abrams tank is 440 kilometers.320  The 
proposed MCS has a main gun that is capable of destroying enemy armor at ranges up to 
eight kilometers.  This is twice as far as the range of the current Abrams tank.  While the 
ability to destroy enemy tanks spotted by sensors at ranges of eight kilometers is an 
improvement over the Abrams, the ability to fight at short-ranges is degraded.  In contrast 
to the Abram tank’s three machine guns, the MCS design has only one machine gun. 321    
Experience in the low end of the spectrum of conflict, particularly when fighting an urban 
insurgency, calls for greater firepower at short ranges. 322  The machine gun intended for 
the MCS is the M2 Browning (.50 caliber).  Although still reliable, it was originally 
designed during World War I.323 
                                                 
318 These traditions also continued with the development of aircraft.   
319 Edward Katzenbach. “The Horse Cavalry in the 20th Century.” Public Policy. (1958),   120-149. 
320 Francis M. Lussier, “The Army's Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives.”  
Congressional Budget Office. (August 2006),   22.  This is because weight restrictions call for a smaller 
fuel tank.   
321 Ibid.,   22. 
322 James E. Gaylord.  The Mounted Combat System: Not Your Current Full Spectrum Armor Force.  
CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004.  
323 The Navy’s Phalanx MK 15 Close-In-Weapon-System (CIWS) is a 20mm electronically guided 
gatling gun, capable of being remotely controlled by the Aegis battle management system.  This capability 
for short range firepower far exceeds current machine guns that the Army employs on vehicles.  If the 
Navy’s “Phalanx” were employed by ground forces, it might offer a tactical advantage to infantry 
equivalent to the ancient Macedonian phalanx.   
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Modular heavy brigades are composed of 58 Abrams tanks, while the proposed 
FCS brigade will be composed of 60 Mounted Combat Systems.  Currently, the majority 
of deployed Abrams tank companies operate as motorized infantry in Humvees.  The 
expertise in maneuvering tanks allows for a smooth transition in the tactics necessary 
with other types of vehicles operating over large areas of terrain.  However, the skills and 
manpower necessary for successful dismounted infantry operations is lacking among 
tankers, who are accustomed to elaborate crew drills and extensive maintenance, rather 
than moving on foot, clearing rooms, and expert rifle marksmanship.  These problems 
will be multiplied in the proposed MCS units because they will have half as many troops 
as current tank units.  This reduction in manpower is based on an autoloader design, and 
the expectation for smaller tank crews (2 people) to perform more tasks.  These tasks 
include driving, gunning, commanding, navigation, communications, maintenance, and 
control of UAVs.  Many of these tasks tend to focus the crew on possible threats at long 
ranges by tracking objects on a screen.  This is problematic if fighting in an environment 
where the enemy may be standing next to the tank.324  
In a 2007 issue of Armor, the professional journal of the armor branch, CPT Irvin 
Oliver noted that while his company did well in counterinsurgency operations, it came at 
the expense of “skill shortfalls” in the areas of “boresighting, gunning, platoon 
maneuver– in short, ‘tanking.’”325   He goes on to say, “we have ultimately focused on 
short-term combat operations in Iraq at the expense of long-term technical 
competency.”326  This illustrates the attitude that irregular warfare is a temporary 
distraction from the pursuit of traditional warfare capabilities.  The same issue of Armor 
magazine, however, features articles on: the fundamentals of room clearing, cavalry 
scouts conducting reconstruction in Afghanistan, an Abrams platoon operating from 
humvees in Tal Afar, Iraq, and an article entitled, “Governance Development.”327  These 
are all examples of non-traditional missions performed in irregular warfare.  Some of the 
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tasks associated with “tanking” may be relevant in order to provide support for troops in 
contact in an urban environment.  However, armor battalions currently reserve this 
emergency role for only one or two platoons of tanks, while utilizing humvees throughout 
the rest of the unit.328 
The Abrams tank was not designed for urban combat.  It offers a level of 
protection, however, that allows its crews to venture where dismounted infantrymen dare 
not move while under fire in an urban setting.  In any case, few recent articles focus on 
traditional tank operations in Armor, since such topics are not currently in demand.329  
Although tanks may not be the most relevant weapon system in irregular warfare, they 
may be useful in limited numbers to support dismounted infantry in hostile urban 
environments.  The larger issue revolves around how to best maintain a large capital 
investment in equipment and specific skill sets, given a limited amount of personnel, 
while simultaneously performing a new set of tasks.   
Many of the weapon systems designed for the Cold War can be relevant in 
irregular warfare, if employed in a different manner.  Nevertheless, the main contribution 
of such systems is in the acquisition and destruction of targets.   This capability is 
important for brief, dangerous periods.  In the long-term, such capabilities cannot be used 
to create stable, democratic governments.  Tanks can operate over a large area, and 
provide short-term dominance in an urban environment.  In the long term, light infantry 
units are necessary to dominate discreet pieces of urban terrain. The Army is attempting 
to combine these capabilities in an effort to bridge a perceived “gap,” based on the 
assumption that this will lead to success in irregular warfare.  Ultimately, this effort 
serves as evolutionary progress towards the same modernization objectives of the Cold 
War era.     
                                                 
328 John DeRosa.  “Platoons of Action: An Armor Task Force’s Response to Full-Spectrum 
Operations in Iraq.” Armor.  (November-December 2005),   9. 
329 In this case, traditional ‘tanking’ refers to tasks such as bore-sighting, muzzle reference system 
updates, and inputting barometric pressure into a ballistic computer.  These tasks are associated with long-
range precision gunnery involving tank-on-tank scenarios.   
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E. MODULARITY: ORGANIZING THE NEW LEGION 
In 1997, Douglas Macgregor proposed a new unit organization for the Army in an 
influential book, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st 
Century.330  Macgregor argued that new technology alone cannot unleash revolutionary 
potential unless it is incorporated into a smaller unit structure.  He based this argument on 
the defeat of the Macedonian phalanx by the “agile” Roman Legions in 200 B.C.331  He 
argues that Roman Legions with 5,000 troops defeated the larger 10,000 man Greek 
Phalanxes due to “superior organization,” and without any significant technological 
advantage.332  This example was used to propose that the Army should reorganize its 
divisions into “combat groups” with around 5,000 troops each, as opposed to the larger 
11,000 to 18,000 strong division structure.333  Macgregor’s proposal was based on the 
idea that the larger division structure consumed too many personnel by having multiple 
levels of command structure.  Additionally, the Army was already stationing and 
deploying brigades separate from their division headquarters.  Many elements of 
Macgregor’s suggestion are evident in the new modular brigade reorganization, which 
was initiated with the 3rd Infantry Division in 2004.  “Modularity” is an effort to increase 
the combat power of the Army by increasing the number of brigades in each division, and 
altering their composition in order to incorporate FCS technologies.  This reorganization 
is based on the idea that “the Army doesn't need more headquarters staff; it needs more 
maneuver elements.”334   
In Breaking the Phalanx, Macgregor claimed, “the arrival of the Roman Legion 
on foreign soil was synonymous with the presence of order, stability, and civilization.”335  
                                                 
330 Douglas Macgregor. Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century. 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).   At the time Colonel Macgregor was an active duty armor officer.  He has 
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February 2004). At: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/02/mil-040224-usa01.htm. 
Accessed on 10 Jan 08. 
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This interpretation of history lacks a description of the actions that take place between 
“arrival” of the legions and “stability,” and is reflective of a gap in the focus of Army 
officers.  This gap is further evident in a chapter of the book entitled, “Fighting with the 
Information Age Army in the Year 2003.”  In this fictional scenario, the proposed 
“combat groups” are used to invade Iraq and Iran in order to destroy weapons of mass 
destruction and install “legitimate government and stability” in the region.  In the 
fictional scenario, Saddam Hussein is killed, and a “friendly government” is installed in 
Baghdad with “moderate public reaction” only a few weeks after the invasion.336   
As a result of his expertise, Macgregor served as an advisor to the Department of 
Defense during planning for the Iraq invasion, and supported Rumsfeld’s vision of using 
fewer troops, in opposition to Shinseki’s demand for more troops.337  Unfortunately, 
stability and order does not instantly appear upon the arrival of the U.S. Army’s new 
modular brigades to foreign soil, so something must be missing in the historical analysis 
of the Roman Legions.  Just as the pants worn by troops indicate the focus of the Army, 
the historical basis for the Army’s reorganization indicates the direction of American 
foreign policy.  Ironically, Macgregor is critic of the FCS, despite the fact that his book 
influenced a reorganization of the Army.338   
Removing humans from delicate tasks that traditionally involve human interaction 
is likely to be counterproductive.  The Army’s attempt to reduce personnel through 
automation, and perform violence in a more distant, indirect manner mirrors the current 
trend in many large corporations, which are also attempting to service customers and 
deliver products using automated systems, fewer personnel, and outsourcing.  Both 
efforts have enraged and isolated large portions of population, whether domestic or 
foreign, while on “hold” with computerized customer service, or when being bombed by 
automated “precision” weapons.   
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FCS equipment is largely designed to enhance survivability, by using networked 
communications, long-range strike, and providing mechanization for the entire Army.  
While “staying alive” might be a successful strategy when defending from an attack, it is 
not a strategy that is likely to lead to victory for an invading force.  This is true regardless 
of the technological aspects of warfare.  This does not imply that expending more blood 
will bring success.  Instead, a successful outcome in the aftermath an invasion can only 
be attained through control of population and territory.  This highly political process 
entails more than new armored vehicles or artillery pieces can provide.     
If the United States wishes to control foreign populations (control of population is 
necessary for success according to the new Counterinsurgency manual), it cannot do this 
with new bombs, missiles, vehicles, and artillery.  Army officers, particularly those in the 
infantry, typically use the following quote when making some point about the futility of 
new technology or other branches of service:  
You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it 
and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep 
it for civilization you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman 
Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.339   
This statement has an element of truth and appeals to the traditions of the infantry 
branch.340  It is an inaccurate depiction, however, of how Roman Legions dominated 
populations.  Putting young men in the mud only serves to get them unnecessarily 
dirty.341  The Romans performed numerous administrative feats to control populations, 
such as conducting a census.342  The U.S. Army must make a priority of getting an 
accurate account of the populations it is assigned to control to be successful in such a 
mission.  Information technologies and data management systems have certainly 
advanced since the time of the Roman Empire.  The U.S. Army is using these 
                                                 
339 T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 50th Anniversary Edition, 
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340 The fact that so many infantrymen quote this statement fits with the proposition, “Where you stand 
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341 This would also undermine efforts to maintain “clean appearance” with the new uniform.   
342 The word census originates from this Roman practice.      
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technologies in the pursuit of better aim and management of artillery and rocket systems 
rather than more useful purposes in irregular warfare.  Tracking personnel and 
maintaining order in busy urban environments is a difficult task, but there are lessons that 
can be learned from large police organizations such as the New York Police Department.  
Simple tasks such as indentifying the registration information for a foreign vehicle based 
on its license plate number (using a laptop database or making a radio call) cannot be 
adequately performed by soldiers in Iraq.    
F. OFFICER PERSONNEL FOR MODULAR BRIGADES 
To expand the number of modular brigade combat teams from 33 to 42, the Army 
will require more junior officers in the ranks of captain and major to serve as commanders 
and staff officers.343  This has created a projected shortage of officers in these critical 
grades.  The projected shortage is based on modularity initiatives rather than increased 
attrition.  Numerous articles claim that officer attrition in these ranks has increased due to the 
strain of multiple deployments.344  These claims are inaccurate, as officer retention varies by 
less than one percent from historical peacetime rates.345  To make up for this projected 
shortage, the Army introduced a menu of incentives to junior officers in exchange for 
continued service.  The incentives fall into two categories:  bonus pay or training and 
education in the skills necessary for irregular warfare.  10,474 officers have elected to receive 
a $35,000 bonus, while only 33 have chosen to receive language training at DLI or training at 
Ranger School, as of December 2007.346  Additionally, 174 officers have chosen to attend 
fully funded graduate school.   Language skills and graduate level education are lacking 
among combat arms officers.  Ranger School trains personnel in small unit leadership and 
dismounted infantry tactics, which may be necessary in irregular warfare.  The fact that the 
Army considers training its officers for irregular warfare as part of a personal incentive 
                                                 
343 Charles Henning. “Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress.” CRS Reports 
for Congress. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006),   5. 
344 Ibid.,   6. 
345 Ibid.,   5.  However, this minor increase in retention may be due to the stop-loss orders for officers 
in deploying units.     
346 Jim Tice. “Service Extends Retention Bonus Deadline for Captains.”  Army Times. (24 December 
2007),   28. 
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program reveals the institution’s attitude towards irregular warfare.  The Army is willing to 
fund advanced training useful in irregular warfare on a voluntary basis, as a personal 
incentive, rather than as a professional expectation.  This has resulted in a lack of 
professionalism in the officer corps.     
In 2003, journalists quoted a senior Army officer in the 4th Infantry Division saying, 
“The only thing these sand niggers understand is force and I’m about to introduce it to 
them.”347  The perception that Iraqis only understand the language of force comes naturally 
for an officer corps in which the language of force is the only proficient language, other than 
English.348  This attitude will be further enabled by the long-range strike capabilities of the 
FCS.  Psychologically, it is easier to kill people who are at a distance both socially and in 
terms of weapon systems ranges.349  A recent RAND computer simulation of a FCS brigade 
refighting the Kosovo War predicted an outcome with two interesting characteristics.  First, 
in a vertical envelopment scenario, the brigade’s offensive mission would eventually revert to 
one of defending the location of the brigade’s airborne insertion.350  Second, the simulation 
calculated that reliance on long-range strike systems for the brigade’s defense would result in 
14,327 civilian casualties, based on the Circular Error Probable (CEP) of various FCS 
“precision” munitions.351  This scenario echoes of the Battle of the Little Bighorn and the 
Battle of Ia Drang, but with more firepower.352     
                                                 
347 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation 
of Iraq. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006),   447. 
348 Marilyn Young. “Counterinsurgency, Now and Forever.” in Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam. 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007),   224. 
349 Dave Grossman. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. (New 
York: Back Bay Books, 1996).  Weapons ranges, social attitudes, and training are central components of 
the book’s thesis.   
350 John Matumura and others. Future Combat Systems Program. (Santa Monica: Arroyo Center 
RAND, 2002), Summary, xvii. 
351 Ibid.   74.  This assumes a CEP range from as low as 3 meters and as high as 90 meters.   
352 In the Battle of the Little Bighorn, General Custer made his famous “last stand” when fighting 
against Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull, leaders of the Lakota and Cheyenne Indian tribes in Montana.  This 
1876 battle serves as a reminder of the vulnerability of cavalry units.  The Battle of Ia Drang, in 1965, is a 
case of “air cavalry” being inserted into a jungle environment, and subsequently relying on massive 
firepower to survive until extracted from the location.  The performance of the FCS in a similar situation 
will depend upon the ability to resupply fuel and munitions from the air, and close air support.  This will 
probably result in a large amount of collateral damage, as the RAND study indicates.     
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G. INFANTRY: “SAVING THE CRUNCHIES” 
Tankers refer to infantrymen as “crunchies,” a term that originates from the sound 
that breaking bones make when a tank runs over a dismounted foot soldier.  When a 
Bradley drops its ramp to dismount the infantrymen carried under armor protection, this 
is referred to as “letting the crunchies loose.”  Tank and mechanized infantry units 
operate as a team during both training and combat.  During training exercises, 
infantrymen usually mark the spots on the ground where they sleep using chemical lights 
to avoid being run over accidentally by a tank while they are sleeping.  In combat, tankers 
typically see their role in terms of “saving the crunchies.”  This was evident with the use 
of Pakistani tanks and Malaysian armored vehicles to rescue Rangers from a hostile 
urban environment in Somalia in 1993, as well as the use of tanks in Fallujah by 
Marines.353  As an armor officer, Shinseki’s transformation vision is an institutional 
attempt to “save the crunchies,” as they are viewed in vulnerable terms from the 
perspective of the armor branch.  The recent BRAC commission’s decision to move the 
armor school to Fort Benning (home of the infantry branch) and consolidate it with the 
infantry school may appear a bureaucratic triumph for infantry over armor.  Nevertheless, 
it does not take account of fact that the traditions of armor involve fighting on the move.  
Infantry traditions involve fighting from stationary positions.  These traditions continue 
in bureaucratic battles.  The cavalry is not moving to the home of the infantry to offer 
peace, but instead to create a “maneuver branch” in which armor and infantry and more 
fully integrated.            
In a recent article in the Armed Forces Journal retired Army General Robert 
Scales, an architect and proponent of the FCS stated: 
First priority should go to those technologies that are most likely to lessen 
the cost of infantry combat. We know that mounted fighting diminishes 
the cost by an order of magnitude. The problem today is that our Cold War 
armored fleet carries too few infantry. Our vehicles are optimized for 
warfare in developed regions where weight, complexity and fuel 
efficiency are not impediments to tactical success. In the future, the fleet 
                                                 
353 Mark Bowden. Black Hawk Down. (Berkley: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999),   271.  The tanks used 
by Pakistan were American-made M-48s, and the Malaysian APCs were German-made Condors; Ahmed 
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must be modernized to allow more infantry to fight mounted in distant 
places for extended periods, to keep them under armor longer and to allow 
infantry to remain protected until very close to the enemy.354  
American infantrymen have more protection in terms of body armor, vehicular armor, 
and medical care, than ever before.  While this is a positive development, it reaches a 
point of diminishing marginal utility as it begins to inhibit the ability to perform tasks 
characteristic of irregular warfare that cannot be performed while in armored vehicles.  
Putting infantrymen in armored vehicles is not “transformational.”  It is simply a 
continuation of Cold War efforts to mechanize the entire Army.  The FCS program seeks 
to homogenize the Army by transforming light infantry divisions into mechanized 
divisions.355   
During the 1970s, numerous Army officers argued that light infantry divisions 
should be completely eliminated from the force structure and replaced by heavy divisions 
that could make a real contribution in defending NATO against an attack by the Warsaw 
Pact.  During the Cold War, critics of the light divisions stated:    
The only mission for which these forces are suitable is that of a low-
intensity, long-duration conflict—another Vietnam.  Given the 
inadvisability and improbability of such a conflict, there is no visible 
justification for keeping these divisions in the force structure.  One of 
these divisions or the 82nd Airborne should be converted to an armored 
division to support our NATO forces.356  
Although, the 101st Infantry Division was also a light division, it used helicopters, and 
this exempted it from the concerns expressed above.  This is because helicopters are used 
to mass the infantry of the 101st at critical points, which is fits with traditional Jominian 
notions of warfare.  Although the light divisions were never fully converted to armored 
divisions, there was notable momentum towards this goal.   
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During the 1980s, the Army experimented with two light divisions at Fort Ord, 
California and Fort Lewis, Washington that were designed to provide more mobility, 
protection, and firepower for light infantry.357  These units were equipped with dune 
buggies that were mounted with .50 caliber machine guns and TOW missiles, with later 
designs suggesting the possibility of arming trucks with a ground-based hellfire missile 
system capable of destroying tanks.358  Additionally, scout platoons at Fort Ord were 
equipped with motorcycles.359  While these developments may have been no match for 
an opponent armed with T-72s, it would have been a significant increase in mobility, 
protection, and firepower for a force that was largely dependent on foot marches, digging 
foxholes, and rifle marksmanship for these functions.  After the end of the Cold War, 
with the drawdown of forces, the Army reduced the number of divisions in its structure 
from 18 to 10, and in this process, the division at Fort Ord was disbanded.360  These old 
ideas, however, were resurrected with the Future Combat System.     
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VI. CONCLUSION: TROUBLE WITH THE FCS MARKETING 
CONCEPT? 
The numerous long-range precision strike systems of the FCS provide a capability 
similar to that of the Air Force.  The Marine Corps has pointed out how the Army’s 
attempt to design rapid deployment units is similar to the purpose of Marine units.  The 
Army’s pursuit of long-range strike and rapid deployment capabilities is ironic 
considering the fact that armies, though slow-moving and composed of short-range 
striking power, are already capable of the most precise application of violence and 
influence through human interaction and line-of-sight firepower.  Bombing or sending 
Marines serves as temporary response to a strategic situation that lacks the same level of 
political commitment than a decision to employ the U.S. Army.  The movement of the 
U.S. Army, with its heavy armored corps and vast logistical infrastructure serves to 
provide both permanent political commitment and tactical staying power.  These 
capabilities and political dynamics are characteristically different from the capabilities 
provided by the Air Force or Marine Corps, as evident with their shorter length of 
deployment for their units.  Political commitment and tactical staying power alone, 
however, do not necessarily translate into a strategic advantage in an offensive situation.  
Decreasing the weight of vehicles while increasing their striking range creates a force 
designed to remain on the defensive when deployed. 
The domination of land – exerting control over territory and populations – cannot 
be performed by precision long-range strike systems.  If such a feat could be 
accomplished in this manner, then there would be no need for an Army.  At best, such 
systems can only serve to deny territory to an adversary, rather than actually dominate 
it.361  If the United States wishes to exert control over foreign populations, even if done 
with a genuine attempt at implanting democratic governments through regime change, it 
must do so the same way the Roman Legions did, take a more radical approach to 
transformation, or wait for politicians to abandon current global endeavors.     
                                                 
361 This became evident during World War I. 
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The Army recently produced several videos to promote the Future Combat 
System.  These videos serve to inform soldiers about the new equipment, while also 
informing the public, the Executive Branch, and Congress of the Army’s progress in 
transformation.  The videos promote the idea that wars can be won with technology.  The 
time-consuming preventive maintenance checks performed by soldiers on vehicles are 
portrayed as unnecessary with FCS vehicles, as computers can perform these tasks, and 
order repair parts based on predictive analysis before a part malfunctions.362  Concerns 
about the complexity of the new equipment in terms of training are alleviated by mention 
of how remotely operated systems use the same hand-controller as the popular X-Box 
360 video game system.363  This implies that most new teenage recruits play video 
games, and can therefore easily figure out how to play war also if they are simply 
provided the same hand-controller for both functions.  While such equipment may 
increase the Army’s capacity to manage remote destruction, the military profession 
entails more than simply managing destruction.  The true course of the FCS program is 
revealed in the opening scene of one of the videos portraying a fictional FCS scenario.  In 
this scene, a commander briefs an operations order to unit equipped with the FCS.  
Before getting into the details of the mission, as a way of stressing the significance of the 
mission to his soldiers, the commander enthusiastically states, “This is a new deal 
gentlemen… We’re not chasing insurgents anymore.”364  This “new deal” is nothing 
more than old wine in new bottles, poured to quench the growing thirst of Mars.   
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